

Current History

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THE MIDDLE EAST

ISRAEL: A GARRISON STATE	<i>Dwight J. Simpson</i>	1
THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC	<i>Harry N. Howard</i>	8
INSTABILITY IN SYRIA	<i>Gordon H. Torrey</i>	13
JORDAN: THE COMMANDO STATE	<i>Norman F. Howard</i>	16
SHADOW ON LEBANON	<i>John B. Wolf</i>	21
ADEN AND SOUTH ARABIA	<i>Roy E. Thoman</i>	27
LIBYA: THE END OF MONARCHY	<i>William H. Lewis</i>	34

REGULAR FEATURES

MAPS • <i>Countries of the Middle East</i>	7
<i>The Arab League</i>	29
<i>Libya</i>	37
CURRENT DOCUMENTS • <i>President Nixon's Statement on the Middle East, 1969</i>	41
<i>Supreme Court Ruling on Immediate School Integration</i>	40
<i>President Nixon's Speech on Vietnam, 1969</i>	42
BOOK REVIEWS • <i>On the Middle East</i>	39
THE MONTH IN REVIEW	53

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by DWIGHT HEATH, Brown University;

WHICH ROUTE FOR THE CANAL?

by ANTHONY S. REYNER, Howard University.

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In this issue seven authors examine the problems of the nations in the turbulent Middle East. The first article shows that in the Israeli-Arab dispute, "the governments on both sides seem for opposite reasons to have reached the common conclusion that the status quo . . . is tolerable . . . and is preferable to full-dress warfare."

Israel: A Garrison State

BY DWIGHT J. SIMPSON

Professor of International Relations, San Francisco State College

IT HAS BEEN more than two years since Israel administered a smashing military defeat to her Arab neighbors, principally Egypt, Syria and Jordan. The "desert blitzkrieg," which lasted only six days in June of 1967, revealed beyond any doubt or discussion that the Israeli war machine was incomparably superior in all respects to the pathetically inept Arab armies. Indeed, so overwhelming was the Arab military defeat that it was commonly predicted in the summer of 1967 that it would take the Arab states several years simply to replace their military equipment, most of which was destroyed or captured by the Israelis. And insofar as the grotesquely bad leadership of the Arab armies' officer corps or the low morale and fighting capacity of the common Arab soldier were concerned, the same prediction set no time limit on the necessarily massive rebuilding program.

Generally speaking, this prediction has been borne out by events since 1967. Although the U.S.S.R. has liberally, even generously, made up most of the equipment losses suffered by the Arabs in the Six Day War, and Soviet military training and advisory teams

have worked diligently to train and improve Arab fighting forces, it is a more or less open secret that the Arab armies are still far from the point where they might envisage success against the Israelis.

This is not to say that war between the two sides is ruled out for the near future. Given the vagaries of both Middle Eastern and Great Power politics, a "fourth round" of the Palestine War might come at any moment. But if it does come within the next eighteen months or two years, the outcome is as predictably certain as anything can be in the complex world of international affairs: the Israelis would again overwhelmingly defeat the Arabs. After 1972, when the Arab military reequipment and retraining program is substantially completed, the scales of comparative military proficiency will be somewhat more balanced, although even then Israeli superiority will probably still be manifest.

For the near future, therefore, it seems that the apparently endless conflict between Arabs and Israelis has moved from the blitzkrieg phase of 1967 to the sitzkrieg (Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan's word) of 1970.

Major military actions on both sides continue unabated but stop, by an unspoken agreement, short of all-out war. The governments on both sides seem for opposite reasons to have reached the common conclusion that the status quo, although undesirable as a permanent condition, is tolerable over the short run and is preferable to full-dress warfare.

For her part, Israel has already achieved all that she probably wants or could reasonably expect from resort to open warfare. The 1967 war was the means by which the map of the Middle East was redrawn nearly overwhelmingly in Israel's favor. Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip and the entire Sinai Peninsula removed from the United Arab Republic its only territories from which any future Egyptian land attack on Israel could be mounted. Consequently, the so-called western front no longer presents any strategic or tactical threat to Israel's safety. Indeed the opposite is true. With massive Israeli military power dug in along the entire eastern bank of the still-closed Suez Canal, it is Egypt's physical safety that is endangered, not Israel's.

On the eastern front (Israel's common border with Syria and Jordan) the situation is much the same. Jordan was physically dismembered by Israel in 1967, losing one-half of her best territory, several of her major cities, and about one-third of her population. Far from presenting any military threat to Israel, Jordan is practically defenseless, and her capital city of Amman lies almost within artillery range of Israeli occupying forces. Syria, having lost the huge territory of the Golan Heights to Israel, also finds herself dangerously exposed. Israeli forces occupying the eastern slopes of the Golan Heights have only 50 miles of open, undefended territory between themselves and the Syrian capital city of Damascus. Consequently, since Israel is the undisputed strategic master of all the Arab territories she now occupies and since there is really nothing more by way of territory that she wants, the present *status quo* of "no war—no peace" is temporarily acceptable to her.

Any further all-out warfare, the result of

which would probably entail the acquisition of unwanted territories and the multiplication of Israel's already formidable occupation administration costs, is seen to be unproductive. Some hawkish voices in Jerusalem have argued that a further all-out war is necessary in order to topple the present governments in Syria, Jordan and Egypt so that Israel can more or less dictate a final peace settlement with the Arab successor regimes. These voices have not predominated, however, and Israel seems firmly committed to pursuit of her interests by means which do not for the immediate future include resort to all-out war.

THE ARAB POSITION

In the Arab states, the respective governments have likewise chosen the "no war—no peace" policy and seem, like Israel, to be determined to maneuver along the brink of war without falling into the abyss. Their reasons, of course, are quite different. As indicated earlier, Israel has overwhelming military superiority. No one knows better than the rulers in Damascus, Amman and Cairo that in the event of a "fourth round" of the Palestine War in the near future the results would almost certainly include their own death or exile, the capture of their capital cities, and the indefinite subjugation of their Arab populations. Hence all that is left is the status quo of "no war—no peace"; this is galling and humiliating for the Arabs but at least in the short run it is tolerable.

For their part, the Arabs have devised many offensive tactics for use against the Israelis, all of which are expected to increase the pressure of attrition but none of which is expected to touch off general war. The pattern seems to alternate as the weeks pass. Sometimes, the focus has been on Egyptian artillery bombardments of Israeli positions along the narrow Suez Canal. At other times, Egyptian pilots in their Soviet-built aircraft swoop over large areas of the Sinai Peninsula, seeking out Israeli targets for bombing and strafing attacks.

Additional pressures on Israel come from other sectors of the Arab world. For instance, the Al-Fatah (Arab irregular or

guerrilla units) have waged a widespread and systematic hit-and-run campaign against Israeli forces. The main bases of the Al-Fatah are in Jordan and in Syria. Arab resistance forces have also engaged in a series of assaults on Israeli citizens and properties outside the Middle East. Several planes have been hijacked, including the TWA Boeing 707 on its Rome-Tel Aviv run. The plane and its 75 passengers, among whom were several Israelis, were diverted to a forced landing at Damascus. Israeli information and tourist offices in Belgium and France have been bombed. These occurrences in particular have dramatized and publicized the Arab cause in the eyes of Europe.

All these events have been very painful for Israel to absorb. First, they have been costly in terms of lives lost and property destroyed. The total of Israelis killed or wounded during 1969 has been very high and, proportionate to Israel's population, has nearly equalled the casualties suffered by United States forces in Vietnam. Second, they have more or less frozen Israel into the posture of an embattled garrison state, with all the negative social, economic and political consequences that this implies. Due to continuing Arab pressure from the various Arab government forces or from the Al-Fatah units, it has not been possible for Israel to return since 1967 to anything resembling peacetime conditions.

After the "second round" of the Palestine War in 1956, there was a fairly lengthy period of respite for Israel. Although it never saw the establishment of a secure peace, this period did bring relative peace allowing extensive demobilization and a sharp reduction of defense expenditures. After the 1967 "third round," however, Israel has become so militarized that there is currently small prospect of an early return to an era when civilian tasks and goals may have precedence over what are defined as military necessities.

ESCALATING TO DEESCALATE

How do the Israelis themselves describe their current policy? The Israeli Chief of Staff, General Haim Bar-Lev, in attempting

to summarize Israel's response to the Arab campaign of attrition, used language which inadvertently revealed what may prove to be an inherent weakness in Israel's position. He said that Israeli military forces have launched a policy of "escalation for the sake of de-escalation": a sharply stepped-up pattern of Israeli raids and punitive expeditions into Arab territory was intended to cause the Arab states to become more tractable and lead them voluntarily to reduce the level of hostilities or even to sue for peace.

Israel's dogged determination to prove the validity of this policy has been striking. She has conducted a prolonged series of punitive and damaging raids into Lebanon, Syria and Jordan. Israeli actions now involve heavily armed forces up to battalion strength, supported by tanks, armored vehicles, helicopter gunships and jet fighter air cover. The most spectacular "search and destroy" mission recently undertaken was the September, 1969, amphibious assault on the U.A.R. across the Gulf of Suez. The massive Israeli force roamed at will along the U.A.R. coastline, killing and wounding hundreds of the hapless Egyptian defenders, smashing installations and eventually withdrawing after terrorizing the entire area for over 10 hours.

Unfortunately for Israel, this policy of "escalation for the sake of deescalation" is contradictory in a manner reminiscent of the policy enunciated by a United States field commander in Vietnam who spoke of the necessity to "destroy a Vietnamese village in order to save it." Israeli escalation has had an effect opposite to what was intended. The military strikes against Arab forces, all invariably successful, succeed only in boosting sagging Arab morale and restoring Arab determination to resist. The more the Israelis escalate the more they find there is reason to heighten the scale of their escalation. Under such conditions, escalation itself becomes a self-fulfilling virtue and its ostensible original purpose is conveniently forgotten. This was more or less conceded by Defense Minister Moshe Dayan and several senior military staff officers during an interview on Israeli television shortly after the massive

amphibious attack on Egypt. The Israeli officials were apparently agreed that the attack, although a nearly unqualified success, would do little to lessen the increasing scale of daily attacks and bombardments across the Suez Canal.

There are also other parallels between Israel's position in the Middle East and the United States position in Vietnam. In both cases, Israelis and Americans are regarded by the "natives" as outsiders and intruders, with no rights, other than self-proclaimed rights, to be where they are. Moreover, in each case the balance of military power and proficiency is strongly on the side of the designated outsiders. And their common experience has been to achieve an unbroken string of military victories which paradoxically have brought neither any nearer to a final peace. Indeed, the American strategy enunciated by President Lyndon Johnson of maintaining "maximum pressure" on the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong to force them to a peace settlement is similar to the strategy recently outlined by General Haim Bar-Lev vis-à-vis the Arab governments and the Al-Fatah: escalating to produce deescalation or even peace.

What the Americans in Vietnam and the Israelis in the Arab world overlook is that their mere presence is the basic unacceptable condition and the principal bar to peace. This is the rock upon which all past peace proposals have foundered. In Israel's case, she intends to maintain her present territorial status and at the same time to force the Arabs into what she would describe as a compromise settlement. But this policy involves a contradiction. The Israelis have confused the process of compromise with concession or even surrender. They are asking the Arabs to agree, under the duress of increasing military pressure, to a political settlement which very clearly reflects the main outlines of the present territorial and military status quo. From the Israeli standpoint, this is described as a compromise. In Arab eyes, it is seen not only as a surrender to unacceptable terms but as a permanent defeat of the legitimate Arab cause.

That the above description of the Israeli position is no exaggeration was made unmistakably plain by Israel's political leaders. Preparatory to the national elections held in October, 1969, a special committee of the ruling Mapai party (Labor) was convened and charged with drafting a position paper on the captured territories. It was the intent, later carried out, to present the electorate with a clearly stated Mapai party rationale concerning the Syrian Golan Heights, the Egyptian Gaza Strip, the major portion of the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula and the vast Jordanian West Bank area, all key parts of the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967. The committee was chaired by Reuben Bar-Katt, an influential Mapai party member, and included in its membership three Cabinet ministers from the ruling Cabinet of Prime Minister Golda Meir: Foreign Minister Abba Eban, Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, and Israel Galili, Minister Without Portfolio. The last committeeman was Yaakov Hazan, a leading member of the Mapam party, which is closely tied to the Mapai in its coalition government. Despite the loss of a clear majority by the Mapai party in the October, 1969, elections, there can be little reason to doubt that its committee-devised formulations are to serve as official government policy in the future.

Without dissent, the committee's report declared that Israel must retain most of the territorial prizes seized from the Arabs in 1967. Specifically, it was declared that Sinai, Gaza and Golan were to be permanently incorporated into Israel. No mention was made of the city of Jerusalem simply because Israel's leaders had already said that the city's status was beyond dispute and Israel's control of it was "non-negotiable." The committee left a slight ambiguity concerning the Israeli-occupied West Bank territory of Jordan. It was declared only that the Jordan River would remain the "eastern security border" or that a new border would be devised that was "not to be crossed by foreign armies." Presumably this meant that if the West Bank territory and its 700,000 Arab inhabitants were to be returned to Jordanian control,

such a transfer could take place only in exchange for a Jordanian agreement that the area would become an Israeli supervised and controlled demilitarized zone.

THE U.N. POSITION

In light of Israel's unswerving determination to retain her expanded realm, acquired at Arab expense in 1967, it is small wonder that Israel's relations with the United Nations have deteriorated to the point of collapse. Following the Six Day War both the U.N. General Assembly and the Security Council have worked hard to restore peace in the Middle East and the record since 1967 shows clearly that their efforts have failed because Israel is steering a course that is incompatible with United Nations objectives.* Several examples illustrate this. On July 4, 1967, the U.N. General Assembly expressed deep concern at the situation observable in Jerusalem as a result of Israeli measures to alter the status of the Holy City. These measures included the removal of portions of Jerusalem's Arab population, the demolition of housing and other buildings belonging to Arabs, and the complete incorporation of Jerusalem into Israel's governmental and administrative structure.

The General Assembly considered these measures invalid and, without a single dissenting vote, called upon Israel to rescind all measures already taken and to "desist forthwith" from taking any further action that would alter the city's status. The General Assembly requested U.N. Secretary General U Thant to report within one week to the Assembly on the situation and Israel's compliance with the resolution. Far from being able to report on Israel's compliance, U Thant reported that Israel was quickening the pace of her attempts to absorb Jerusalem and that her actions were exactly opposite to the spirit and letter of the General Assembly resolution. After receiving U Thant's report, on July 14, 1967, the Assembly adopted, again with no dissenting votes, a second resolution

on Jerusalem which deplored Israel's defiance of the Assembly and reiterated its call to Israel to refrain from altering the status of Jerusalem.

Serious as it is, Israel's defiance of the General Assembly does not compare with her rejection of the prestige and authority of the United Nations Security Council. In the aftermath of the 1967 war, the Palestine question provided one of the few occasions when the Security Council's members found themselves in complete agreement. On November 22, 1967, the Council unanimously adopted a resolution setting forth principles by means of which peace might be restored to the area. These included: a) "Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent [1967] conflict," and b) "Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force."

At the same time, the Security Council affirmed the necessity for guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area, for achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem, and for guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every state in the area. The Council also requested the Secretary General to designate a Special Representative "to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the states concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution." U Thant selected Gunnar Jarring, the Swedish Ambassador to Moscow, to perform this delicate task on behalf of the Security Council. After more than two years of unremitting effort, Jarring was forced to concede defeat. Israeli intransigence on the question of the captured Arab territories had made his mission unsuccessful, and Jarring himself withdrew in late 1969 to his diplomatic post in Moscow.

* Ed. note: Israel demands face-to-face direct negotiations with the Arab states, a demand none of the states is willing to grant.

Taking cognizance of the failure of the Jarring mission, the Security Council on July 3, 1969, unanimously reaffirmed its 1967 resolution and deplored "the failure of Israel to show any regard" for the various U.N. resolutions on the subject. The Council also censured all measures taken by Israel to alter Jerusalem's status and declared that all legislative and administrative measures and actions by Israel with reference to Jerusalem were invalid. Finally, in sharp language almost never used in such documents, the Security Council requested Israel to state its intentions with regard to the Council's resolutions. Israel simply continued to ignore the Security Council's resolution and this response underscored very effectively the state of Israel's relations with the United Nations.

RELATIONS WITH THE U.S.

Since Israel has made the policy decision to retain the vast captured Arab territories, has committed herself to a strategy of increased pressure and military force on her Arab neighbors and has, by her actions, foreclosed the possibility of cooperating with the United Nations, two major questions remain to be answered. What of her relationship with the United States, her principal sponsor and benefactor for the past 20 years? And what of Israel's economy and its capacity to withstand the pressures imposed by the conditions of "no war—no peace?"

In September, 1969, Prime Minister Golda Meir visited the United States for a meeting with President Richard Nixon and an extended tour of several major American cities. Mrs. Meir's visit to the United States was planned originally for her predecessor in office, the late Premier Levi Eshkol. It was first intended as a routine mission that would have allowed Eshkol to meet the newly-elected Richard Nixon. However, it took on far greater meaning following the extended visit to the United States by King Hussein of Jordan in April, 1969, and assumed an even larger significance because Mrs. Meir is an unrelenting "hawk" and an unyielding proponent of Israel's "tough" policy toward the Arabs.


In an authentic American idiom, the Israeli leader (who lived and worked in Milwaukee until as a young woman and militant Zionist she left for Israel) spoke of the "shopping list" which she intended to present to President Nixon. Prominent on her list were military equipment and economic aid. Israel had already received American Hawk ground-to-air missiles, Skyhawk attack bombers and the latest model Phantom jets. Mrs. Meir probably asked President Nixon for more of these items but no specific announcement indicated that her request had been granted.

Indeed, there are several points upon which the United States and Israel disagree. Just before Mrs. Meir's arrival, President Nixon addressed the United Nations General Assembly and declared that while "secure and recognized" borders were needed for a Middle Eastern settlement, no firm or lasting peace could be achieved with "substantial alterations" of the area's map. This last was taken to be a none too subtle censure of Israel by the United States for her attitude on the captured Arab territories. The statement by President Nixon, together with the fact that the United States voted for the Security Council's resolution of 1967 that required Israel's withdrawal from captured Arab lands, made it plain that it was inappropriate to discuss further military supplies to Israel. It was clear that Israel intended to use them in pursuit of a policy with which the United States firmly disagreed.

Approximately the same result obtained in the realm of economic aid. Mrs. Meir probably sought financial aid in the form of delayed payments for military supplies already purchased or a long-term financial loan. Israel's economy continues to rest very heavily on foreign currency reserves, but post-1967 arms

(Continued on page 47)

Dwight James Simpson has had many years of experience in the Middle East. He served as president of Robert College, Istanbul, in 1966-1967. He has been chairman of the Area Studies Program at Williams College and has taught political science at the University of California at Berkeley.



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Countries Of The Middle East

"During 1968-1969, there was considerable turbulence in the United Arab Republic and Nasser appeared to have lost something of his charisma, if not his political leadership . . . but . . . in May, 1968, a plebiscite produced an almost 100 per cent endorsement of the President, his policies and actions."

The United Arab Republic

BY HARRY N. HOWARD

*Adjunct Professor, School of International Services,
The American University*

BECAUSE OF ITS LOCATION at the eastern end of the Mediterranean Sea, its central position between Arab North Africa and the Arab East, and its leading position in the Arab world, there are those who hold that the United Arab Republic occupies one of the most important strategic positions in the Middle East. There has been an awareness of this fact at least since the period of Napoleon; a French publicist, Albert Sorel, observed at the end of the nineteenth century that whoever touched Egypt touched the Eastern Question. In more recent days, the Soviet Union seems to have appreciated the dictum, as have other outside powers. Despite its military defeat in the contest of 1967 and the closing of the Suez Canal, the United Arab Republic still occupies a commanding position. The nation has suffered severe economic losses and seemingly insoluble domestic problems. President Gamal Abdel Nasser's leadership has been open to some question and his shield has been tarnished. Yet it appeared at the end of 1969 that his regime was still viable and that the U.A.R. retained its important and even key position in the Arab world.

Although before the Six Day War the United Arab Republic had an area of some 386,200 square miles, only about 13,500 square miles, or 3.5 per cent, were under cultivation and settled. The rest of the country is desert, except for some 2,850 square miles covered by the surface of the Nile River, lakes

and marsh areas. In 1969, its estimated population stood at some 34,500,000 (density 2,800 per square mile in the Nile Valley), and the projection for 1980 was some 46,750,000, thanks to one of the world's high birth rates. Some of the U.A.R.'s population problems are also highly complicated by thousands of Palestinian refugees, largely from the Gaza Strip, who have sought refuge in the United Arab Republic; other people were displaced from the battle zones in the area of the Suez Canal. About 57 per cent of the people depend upon agriculture and the basic population, of course, is concentrated in the few fertile areas of the country, essentially in the Nile Valley.

There are also very serious problems of urbanization. In 1969, Cairo had a population of some 4,220,000, Alexandria of 1,800,000, Giza of 572,000 and Port Said of 282,000—urban populations which could hardly be supported by the Egyptian industrial edifice. The literacy rate stood at 26 per cent by 1969, although there was a growing school population of some 3,450,000 in elementary schools, 820,000 in secondary schools, 50,000 in teacher-training institutions, 128,000 in vocational training and some 177,123 in the universities of the country.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Despite the severe losses which the United Arab Republic suffered as a result of the *blitzkrieg* in June, 1967, its very obvious eco-

conomic limitations and its almost insoluble problems, by 1968–1969 there was some evidence of promising economic development. By the 1960's, all large financial, industrial and commercial enterprises had been nationalized, with only small concerns still in private hands, and it was estimated that 90 per cent of the economy was controlled by the government. The largest concentration of industry was in the Governate of Alexandria (24.5) and 76 per cent of all industry was concentrated in the four Governates of Alexandria, Giza, Cairo and Qalyubia. The Gross National Product (GNP) had reached \$5.527 billion by 1965.

With the virtual completion of the Aswan High Dam by 1969—major work on the main curtain having been completed in June—economic planning in the U.A.R. focused on a number of other development projects. The most promising aspect of the U.A.R. economy in the period following the June, 1967, conflict lay in the steady increase in the production of petroleum. There were prospects for large-scale development of oil in the Western desert. If it materialized, this would give the U.A.R. a sound exchange position, permit a much-expanded program of development within the country and substantially reduce, if not eliminate, dependence on foreign financial support. This, however, was a prospect for the future, not a present or immediately foreseeable reality. If there were nothing as yet to indicate a duplication of the Libyan experience, nevertheless it is interesting to observe that production during 1969 is estimated to have reached a rate of about 270,000 barrels per day, as compared with 115,000 per day during 1966–1967. The losses of oil in the Sinai peninsula had been replaced, and it is thought that production may increase by another two-thirds by the end of 1970. Early in 1969, the Ministry of Industry and Petroleum and Mineral Resources announced a new oil discovery by the state General Petroleum Company at al-'Uyun. While U.A.R. authorities had not awarded a contract for the projected pipeline between Port Suez and Alexandria, high priority was given to its completion by the end of 1970, and

Italian and French groups appeared favored to provide the financing of the \$250-million to \$300-million project.

There were also projects for expanded iron and steel production facilities, construction of a \$45-million, 40,000-ton capacity aluminum plant with Soviet assistance, and the building of a 450,000-ton per year triple phosphate plant at a cost of some \$70 million. Although the Suez Canal was closed to all traffic after June, 1967, there were plans for its improvement, if and when the canal were restored to international commerce. Early in 1969, the chairman of the Suez Canal Authority indicated that clearing of the canal would be accompanied by improvements to enable tankers of up to 250,000 tons to transit the canal, the pre-1967 limit having been some 80,000 tons.

The U.A.R. imported some \$693 million worth of goods during 1968, of which the United States share was some \$48 million (7 per cent), and it exported some \$622 million, the United States share being \$33 million (5 per cent). The budget for 1969–1970 allocated some \$805 million for investments, with the major shares going to industry (\$283.8 million), agriculture (\$86.7 million), irrigation (\$60.5 million), electricity (\$85.3 million), housing and utilities (\$54.6 million), and transportation and communications (\$109.3 million).

Essentially the U.A.R. has a viable economic base, even if population growth and the weak industrial base have kept the people at a low living standard. Yet as noted above, the nation suffered economically from the 1967 conflict, as it does from continuation of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Revenues from traffic in the Suez Canal ceased with the closure of that artery, and the loss of oil in the Sinai peninsula was significant. Tourism was cut substantially, of course, as a result of the conflict in the Middle East, and the worst cotton worm infestation (1968) in half a century reduced income from that source considerably. Nevertheless, the Suez Canal revenues were made up (following the Khartoum Conference of August–September 1967) by contributions of some \$250 million annually

from the oil-rich states of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Libya. These were not likely to continue forever, however, and did not arise from considerations of pure charity and idealism. Furthermore, they reflect somewhat on the dignity of President Nasser and serve as a limitation on his freedom of action, whether in the Arab world or elsewhere, whatever their illustration of Arab solidarity and unity.

Until the June, 1967, conflict, the United Arab Republic had received assistance from the United States, much of it in food, in the amount of some \$1.039 billion (1946-1966), as compared with United States aid to Israel in the amount of \$1.086 billion, out of a total of some \$11.625 billion, for the Middle East as a whole. During the period 1954-1966, the Sino-Soviet bloc rendered assistance to the U.A.R. in the amount of some \$1.636 billion, out of a total of some \$4.298 billion for the area as a whole, largely concentrated on the Aswan High Dam project. During the period of 1962-1966, the figures for Soviet bloc assistance totaled \$1.408 billion for the U.A.R.

INTERNAL POLITICS

A strong sense of Egyptian nationalism, sometimes of xenophobic intensity, has motivated the government of the United Arab Republic. Despite his losses in the 1967 conflict, and his brief resignation from the presidency, Nasser has continued to be a popular leader. He is master of the basic tricks of the trade of political leadership, many of them learned since his advent to the leadership during 1952-1954 and cemented during the Suez conflict of 1956. On the home front, he has continued to provide the people with a symbol of Egyptian nationalism and progress, despite the tarnish of 1967.

Whatever may be thought of him in the West, Nasser has also provided an image of Egyptian independence and dignity. Since 1962, the United Arab Republic has continued to operate under the one-party system of the Arab Socialist Union, which fosters a socialist, authoritarian and cooperative society, with basic units in the village, the fac-

tory, the school, business enterprises or urban centers. Within the framework of a Muslim culture and society, the U.A.R. has moved steadily, if somewhat cautiously, toward a more secular society. While much of the polity was developed on a pragmatic, rather than a dogmatic or doctrinaire basis, in recent years it has moved toward greater ideological commitment. Nasser himself declared on December 4, 1968, that the U.A.R. did not aim at developing a "liberal society," or an open Western society, in which there were different political parties, but toward the development of "open revolutionism," whatever that may mean in reality.

During 1968-1969, there was considerable turbulence in the United Arab Republic and Nasser appeared to have lost something of his charisma, if not his political leadership. A number of plots and trials of presumed "traitors" and "spies" were reported, with former Cabinet ministers among the accused. Nasser himself indicated that some 800 political prisoners had been detained by the government. The government was reorganized in March, 1968, and in May, 1968, a plebiscite (with 98 per cent participation) produced an almost 100 per cent endorsement of the President, his policies and actions. Elections on January 8, 1969, for the National Assembly returned 319 candidates of the Arab Socialist Union, and 11 independent candidates.

Like other countries around the world, the United Arab Republic was the stage of large-scale student riots in the late 1960's. It was reported on November 2, 1968, for example, that four people had been killed and 43 wounded, when "non-students" infiltrated a peaceful student demonstration at Mansurah, protesting a tightening of educational standards. The casualties had occurred, it was said, when the infiltrators attacked government security forces. The situation became so serious that all universities were closed on November 24, 1968. On December 2, 1968, Nasser observed that the United Arab Republic could not tolerate any more student disturbances; he held "outside" elements responsible for the disorders. On January 7,

1969, it was announced that university professors and students, held in connection with the November disturbances, would not be tried, but would be released for disciplinary action by the various universities. On January 11, 1969, the universities were allowed to reopen.

RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION

The Soviet Union remained the strongest supporter of the United Arab Republic during 1968–1969, as it had been in years past, whether in the economic and military or in the political sense. The first Soviet short-range ground-to-air missiles were installed, and it was reported in October, 1968, that the U.S.S.R. had pledged to supply 150 supersonic jet fighters and some 500 tanks, the estimated value of new Soviet military equipment being some \$2.5 billion. Some 3,000 Soviet military technicians were estimated to be in the U.A.R. In addition, the U.S.S.R. was to help in the construction of a new industrial complex at Helwan, near Cairo, in the amount of some \$800 million. When Nasser visited the Soviet Union in May, 1968, presumably for medical treatment, Party Secretary Leonid Brezhnev is reported to have told him that the U.S.S.R. and the U.A.R. would “always be together” in the Arab struggle for “liberation.” This theme was echoed in later visits to Cairo, in the fall of 1968 and in 1969, by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, along with Soviet notes of caution to avoid escalation in the Arab-Israeli conflict. But there were also some indications that despite Soviet support—and perhaps also as a result of it—there was unrest because of Soviet intervention in the U.A.R.’s domestic problems, and hints that the U.A.R. had even asked for the recall of Soviet Ambassador Sergei Vinogradov. Meanwhile, the Soviet Mediterranean fleet made regular calls at U.A.R. ports, even if “bases” were not available, as it did at Algerian ports, farther west.

While ties with the Soviet Union appeared to be tightening, ties were also tightened with members of the Soviet bloc of states. East Germany, now fully recognized by the

U.A.R., had not only entered into diplomatic relations with the U.A.R., but on November 18, 1968, signed a trade agreement in the amount of E£32 million for 1969, and a pact of scientific cooperation. Rumania signed an agreement to increase her 1969 trade by some 13 per cent, in the amount of E£22 million, and Poland (December 4, 1968) agreed to increase mutual economic cooperation and to collaborate in expanding the steel and non-ferrous metal industries. On December 27, the Yugoslav firm *Brodogospas* agreed with the Alexandria Port Authority to begin clearing that port in January, 1969. On April 14, 1969, an agreement was signed with Czechoslovakia to provide locomotives, electrical equipment and street cars, along with needed technical assistance.

RELATIONS WITH THE U.S.

Relations with the United States continued to be lukewarm, if not openly hostile; they were conducted in the gray diplomacy of the Spanish Embassy in Cairo, with a sizeable United States section, with Donald Bergus in charge for the United States. An Egyptian section of the Indian Embassy in Washington, D.C., acted in a similar capacity. In March, 1968, Nasser conceded that he had been in error in accusing the United States of collusion with Israel during the 1967 conflict, and he seemed somewhat hopeful that with the departure of President Lyndon Johnson and the advent of President Richard Nixon, relations between the United Arab Republic and the United States would be restored to normalcy.

In an interview with *Newsweek* on February 10, 1969, Nasser indicated that one of the important roadblocks concerned United States policy in the continuing Arab-Israel conflict. While there had been hints of a more “even-handed” policy, as outlined in Pennsylvania Governor William Scranton’s mission in December, 1968, Nasser saw little sign of movement in that direction. The United States, in his view, continued to support Israel, had not condemned Israel’s invasion of Arab territory, and was supplying her with Phantom F-4 jets. United States

actions gave him the impression that it was the policy of the United States to support Israel's occupation of Arab territory. On the other hand, United States Secretary of State William P. Rogers told the House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs on July 17, 1969, that the United States was willing to resume diplomatic relations with the United Arab Republic, if its government so desired, and, in fact, would welcome the resumption of diplomatic relations. Whatever the accomplishment of quiet diplomacy at the United Nations in the fall of 1969, U.A.R. Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad roundly denounced United States official policy in his public statement in September of that year.

Despite the continuing break in United States-U.A.R. diplomatic relations, cultural relations remained. The gift of the Temple of Dendur to the American people was a significant example. It is also important that, with the exception of a short period immediately following the 1967 conflict, the American University in Cairo (1919) has continued to function in Cairo. That institution has a student body of some 1,300, the majority of the students coming from the U.A.R. and Jordan, and the rest from some 40 countries, including the United States. It maintains a Center for Arabic Studies and a Social Science Research Center which are making outstanding contributions in their respective fields, from both of which Americans and Arabs derive long-range benefits. It is, perhaps, noteworthy that annual United States contributions to the American University in Cairo have been in the neighborhood of \$1 million in U.A.R. funds (counterpart) and \$200,000 in American dollars (\$1.740 million during 1969).

Other Western states appeared to have fared somewhat better than the United States in relations with the U.A.R., this being especially true of the United Kingdom, which resumed relations during 1968, and France, which did not break relations. Trade with Spain, especially with regard to oil shipments, and with Denmark increased. At the end of April, 1969, there were reports of discus-

sions in Brussels as to possible associate membership for the U.A.R. in the European Economic Community, and on May 12, 1969, the World Food Program announced allocation of some \$45 million to the U.A.R. for land settlement and reclamation.

Egyptian influence with other Arab states appeared to have weakened somewhat during 1968-1969, partly because of the 1967 disaster, and partly because of the U.A.R.'s dependence upon Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Libya for financial support and its possible loss of freedom to maneuver. Moreover, there was a resurgence of Arab guerrilla action against Israel, especially by Al-Fatah, and there was little indication that the guerrillas paid any more attention to Nasser than to other Arab government leaders. Nevertheless, there was still a movement toward some kind of concerted action, and many visits of Arab leaders to Cairo, calls for summit meetings and, finally, a meeting of Muslim leaders at Rabat during September, 1969, the tangible results of which it was not possible to assess.

THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

The Arab-Israeli conflict, with the United Arab Republic playing a major role, continued at an accelerating pace during 1968-1969, with serious escalation toward the end of the year and little, if any, sign of a formal settlement. Israel continued to occupy the Egyptian territory of the Sinai Peninsula, opposite the Suez Canal, and the Gaza Strip, which had been under Egyptian military administration during 1948-1967. While there were some constructive moves under the Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967, largely through Ambassador Gunnar V. Jarring's mission, there appeared to be little substantial progress in the direction of

(Continued on page 48)

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"While the jockeying for position within the Syrian regime will continue, and the enmity between the Damascus and Baghdad regimes may increase, basic Syrian policies are unlikely to change during the foreseeable future."

Instability in Syria

BY GORDON H. TORREY

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AMONG THE MOST politically unstable of the Arab countries, Syria is one of the most unrelenting proponents of animosity toward Israel. Ruled by the radical Marxist faction of the Ba'ath party, Syria is a vigorous exponent of Arab nationalism and has adherents in many other Arab countries, particularly Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq.

The Damascus regime consists of an uneasy coalition of military and civilian radicals who seized power in February, 1966, from the more "orthodox" Ba'athist leaders. The latter had founded the party in the mid-1940's and had gained control of the country in a military coup in 1963. While the present regime ostensibly rules by means of decrees issued in the name of the Ba'ath Party Command, actual power is exercised by a military junta led by Defense Minister General Hafiz al-Asad, who ousted his predecessor, General Salah al-Jadid, in February, 1969. Asad has been billed as a supporter of the Ba'athist elements who would disassociate Syria from her close ties with Moscow, establish a closer liaison with the more orthodox Ba'athist regime in Iraq and generally moderate Syria's international policies. However, recognizing the fragility of his own position, Asad carefully effected a compromise with his rivals in the spring of 1969. Hence, the new cabinet formed late in May, 1969, represented no real change in the party's policies.

The regime is plagued, like all regimes before it, with factionalism. Points of con-

tention have been the relationship with U.A.R. President Gamal Abdel Nasser, the amount of freedom to be allowed the Communists, and the personal and religious rivalries always present in a country with a multiplicity of ethnic and religious groups and a diversity of cultural backgrounds. The opportunism, poor education and doctrinaire attitude of Syria's radical elements and the lack of mature leadership further complicate the problem of achieving stability, tranquility and progress. The middle classes are generally dissatisfied and the lower classes—although generally catered to by the regime—are discontented. The army's firm grip on the government and a police-state atmosphere keep the populace under control.

Syria's leadership is preoccupied with factionalism within the military, and with the relationship between the military and civilian elements in the Ba'ath party. Parliamentary elections, which had been scheduled for September, 1968, were delayed without any announcement. Apparently, failure to hold the elections was caused by the inability of the Ba'ath to reach understandings with other leftist political elements in the country, such as the group led by Akram al-Hawrani, an opportunist radical politician who has been active in Syrian politics for a generation. Another political grouping with whom the Ba'ath has sought an accommodation is the pro-Nasser group which is insistent on a share of the political power. Meanwhile, General Asad has been assiduously trying to

increase his power by installing his followers in civilian government posts, in much the same manner as he installed them in army posts. Future internal political events will be influenced to a considerable extent by conditions in the Arab world and the Arab-Israeli situation. Syria's relations with the other Arab states, likewise, will be influenced by her internal conditions.

SYRIA AND THE WEST

Naturally xenophobic, Syria's relations with the West have been greatly influenced by two factors—the French mandate from 1920 to 1945, and the creation of Israel in 1948. French dominance led to a strong Arabic nationalist movement which has been characterized by an emphasis on Arab culture. The existence of Israel has led to a virulent anti-Americanism because of Washington's close ties with Tel Aviv. Because of this, the Soviet Union has made great gains in Syria by furnishing arms and extending economic assistance. The 1967 war with Israel resulted in the rupture of diplomatic relations with the United States and reinforced an unrelenting hostility toward Israel. Israel seized the Golan Heights overlooking Lake Tiberias and occupied an extensive area of Syrian territory which, in all probability, she will not return. The Damascus regime has refused to recognize the November 22, 1967, United Nations Resolution regarding the basis of a settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute, although Egypt and Jordan—the two other belligerents—have done so.

A large share of the responsibility for the 1967 Six Day War belongs to Syria. Syria promoted Arab fedayeen (guerrilla) actions against Israel from bases in Jordan, and almost constant firing on Israeli settlements from the Golan Heights. Since the war, the Syrian regime has given extensive assistance to the fedayeen movement and has organized its own fedayeen group, Sai'qa, to keep up the battle against Israel. While generally refraining from allowing raids from Syrian territory, the Damascus regime has supported fedayeen incursions from Jordan and, in recent months, from southern Lebanon. This

latter tactic has brought about retaliation by the Israelis against fedayeen bases in southern Lebanon and has resulted in increased instability in Lebanon.

RELATIONS WITH IRAQ AND JORDAN

Syrian relations with Iraq in general have been characterized by antagonism. Although both regimes are Ba'athist, they represent two rival factions of the party, with Baghdad following a more "orthodox" Ba'athist ideological line. Baghdad has served as a refuge for Ba'athist opponents of the Damascus regime. This factionalism has led each regime to support conspiracies against the other. In actuality, there is little to choose between the two; both are radical and military-dominated, so that the rivalry lies more in the realm of personal ambitions than in ideology. The 1967 war with Israel muted this conflict; thus some Iraqi troops have been stationed in southern Syria as part of the Arab states "Eastern Command" defense arrangements.

With royalist Jordan to the south, Syria has adopted an incongruous attitude, exhibiting considerably less open hostility than she has shown to her compatriots in Baghdad. In conformity with the objectives of the "Eastern Command," some Syrian troops have moved into northern Jordan to bolster the front against Israel.

RELATIONS WITH THE U.A.R.

Syria's relationship to the U.A.R. has been a problem since the breakaway from Egypt in 1961. The Ba'athist regime has had a particularly delicate problem. Both Nasser and the Ba'ath have been strong advocates of Arab unity, yet the two regimes have never been able to reach agreement on the form and leadership of a United Arab state. In reality, Damascus and Cairo are rivals for leadership in the Arab unity movement, but each must pay lip service to the concept of unity, while striving against the other for dominance.

Since the 1967 war, the two regimes have tempered their rivalries in order to help preserve the solid Arab front against Israel. As previously mentioned, however, Syria has

refused so far to accept the United Nations Resolution of 1967 and consistently has pressed for a "confrontation" against Israel. Interestingly enough, it has been Egyptian and commando troops that have been trading blows with the Israeli forces, not those of Syria. But Syria has refused to participate in any negotiations for a peace settlement. She refused to participate in the 1967 Khartoum "summit" conference of Arab nations at which Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Libya were "sandbagged" by Nasser into providing economic support to Egypt and Jordan, which had borne the brunt of the fighting against Israel in the war and whose land was occupied by the Israelis. In short, Syria's leaders have tried to appear more radically Arab nationalist and anti-Israel than Nasser (Iraq, too, has refused to recognize the United Nations resolution). The Syrian regime refused to participate in the Islamic Summit Conference at Rabat in September, 1969, since the summit was a symbol of the conservative regimes.

SYRIA AND THE SOVIET UNION

Syria's relations with the Soviet Union have fluctuated somewhat since 1967. While Moscow has largely replaced the Syrian Army's loss in the Six Day War, political relations have not been highly satisfying to Moscow. Syria's hard stance toward any negotiations leading toward a peace settlement with Israel by the Arab belligerents has made Moscow's position in the negotiations for a settlement much more difficult; it has forced both the Egyptians and Jordanians to be much more cautious in public regarding a settlement, lest they be charged with being "soft on Israel" by the radical regime in Damascus. Syria's vociferous support for the fedayeen also has complicated the negotiating positions of Nasser and Jordan's King Hussein.

Syria has become almost totally dependent on the Soviet Union for arms since 1955. As a consequence, Syria has been host to Soviet military technicians numbering in the neighborhood of 500 personnel in 1969. Some of them advise Syrian military units in the field, and others are stationed at military head-

quarters. Hundreds of Syrian military personnel have been trained in Russia.

In addition to military aid, the Soviet Union has furnished in the neighborhood of \$250-million worth of economic and technical assistance over the past dozen years. As a consequence of these military and economic ties, Syrian trade with the European Communist countries constitutes over one-third of Syria's exports, mostly cotton and grain. Imports other than arms from the Communist countries are much less, proportionately, running in the neighborhood of about 15 per cent of Syria's total imports.

Communist aid has included oil storage facilities, a railroad from Homs to Qamishli—and Moscow has agreed to build a new line from Damascus to Homs—and a sugar refinery. In 1966, Moscow agreed to provide the financing for a Euphrates River dam, a project that may cost the Soviet Union as much as \$200 million. Accompanying the arms and economic assistance have been a number of cultural agreements. Syria has sent students to the Communist countries, and has received Soviet teachers. In addition to cultural contacts, the Soviet Union has attempted to establish relations with Syria's large Armenian community and to establish influence in Syria's Greek Orthodox community, as it has attempted to do in other Arab countries.

In return for all this assistance, Syria has followed a number of policies pleasing to Moscow. She has adopted Moscow's line on Vietnam, recognized both North Korea and North Vietnam, and followed Moscow's propaganda line almost entirely on international issues. Syria has not, however, become Moscow's puppet, and strains have appeared from time to time in the two countries' diplomatic

(Continued on page 47)

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"Jordan's political situation is not much better than its military [situation], although the country is more stable and the King has survived far longer than any outside observer thought possible."

Jordan: The Commando State

BY NORMAN F. HOWARD

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THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM of Jordan is a small state, with an area of 37,000 square miles, almost 90 per cent of which is desert. Jordan's population of 2,100,000 is about evenly divided between "West Bank" Palestinians who fled to or were annexed by Transjordan as a result of the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, and "East Bank" Jordanians whose loyalty is not to Palestine but to the Hashemite monarchy. The country is poor (GNP per capita, at \$260 per year, is about one-sixth of Israel's); it lacks natural resources, is chronically short of water, and is absolutely dependent on outside financial support. Though considerable economic progress and some movement toward the political integration of the divergent Palestinian and Transjordanian communities have been achieved in the last 10 years, Jordan's future course remains in doubt. For the fact is that since June 5, 1967, the country's very existence—its political life, its economy, even its relations with other states—has been determined largely by the endless confrontation with Israel.

During the Six Day War, the 50,000-man Jordanian army was crushed, the West Bank was overrun, and Jerusalem was forcibly annexed by Israel. Jordan's economic losses were severe. The West Bank, less than 10 per cent of Jordan's total area, is a fertile agricultural region, which accounted for

much of the country's prewar industrial output. Israel permits the trucking of agricultural produce across the Jordan River to the East Bank; however, there are indications that this policy may be discontinued in order to discourage guerrilla attacks and inhibit infiltration.¹ The loss of Jerusalem, the Muslim world's third holiest city, has been a serious economic and psychological blow. Tourism, once a thriving industry (over 600,000 people visited Jordan in 1966), has been reduced to a trickle.

THE MILITARY SITUATION

Despite these harsh realities and King Hussein's ardent desire for peace, Jordan has not been forced to submit to Israeli terms. The war with Israel continues, and Jordan struggles to maintain her somewhat artificial identity amidst the pressures of Israeli military blows, the developing strength of the Palestinian nationalist movement, and the seemingly inexorable march of Arab republicanism. Paradoxical as it may appear, the nearly complete destruction of Jordan's army was not a total defeat. As was the case with Egypt, the Jordanian will to resist was not broken, and in two and one-half years the Jordanian ground and air forces have been reorganized and reequipped. These forces are incapable of defending the country against a sizeable Israeli thrust, yet they provide a useful cover for the harassing tactics of the Palestinian guerrillas who, despite Israeli denials of their effectiveness,

¹ See *The New York Times*, September 23, 1969, p. 3.

constitute an increasingly significant military and political force. The Palestinians represent not only a danger to Israel but also a menace to King Hussein, who must balance the limited interests of the monarchy against the aspirations of a refugee community which more than ever looks to the creation of a Palestine republic. To complicate Hussein's problem, the Jordanian army has frequently stood with the commandos, notably at Karameh, in March, 1968, when a large Israeli force crossed the Jordan River and after severe fighting destroyed the town.

As the foregoing suggests, the war with Israel has increasingly preoccupied the Jordanian government and people. In the past year, Palestinian attacks against civil and military installations in Israel and Israeli "retaliations" and reprisal raids against Jordan have mounted in intensity. Political uncertainties have inhibited long-range development programs and economic planning, and more attention has been paid to the needs of the army. The 1969 budget of J.D. 89.3 million (\$250 million) allotted 44 per cent to the military, with 22 per cent less devoted to economic development than in 1968.² Budget deficits have been covered by grants totaling about \$106 million per year (as agreed upon at Khartoum in 1967) from Kuwait, Libya, and Saudi Arabia, with the latter providing an additional \$36 million for arms purchases in June, 1968.³ Great Britain has sold Jordan about 60 Centurion tanks (which began arriving in February, 1969), Tigercat surface-to-air missiles (with delivery scheduled for early 1970) and a small number of obsolescent Hawker Hunter

jet fighters. The United States ended its arms embargo against Jordan early in 1968 and concluded a new arms sales agreement of some \$100 million, including a reported 100 Patton M-48 tanks and 12 F-104 Starfighters. Two additional squadrons of F-104's were to be delivered under the terms of a 1966 agreement, which had been held up by the Six Day War.

These arms have appreciably strengthened Jordan's defense posture, but the army remains weak, and some Jordanian parliamentarians have criticized the country's dependence on Western military aid. The air defense capability is virtually nil, and Jordan cannot prevent the almost daily Israeli air attacks against Palestinian guerrilla and regular army positions. In December, 1968, for example, heli-borne Israeli commandos destroyed two rail and highway bridges deep inside Jordanian territory, and returned apparently unscathed. On March 16, 1969, the Israeli air force attacked to within six miles of the Jordanian capital, without significant opposition. Two Israeli raids near al-Salt, in August, 1968, and again in March, 1969—both of which were condemned by the U.N. Security Council—resulted in nearly 45 civilian dead and 100 wounded, according to Jordanian sources.⁴

THE POLITICAL SITUATION

Jordan's political situation is not much better than its military, although the country is more stable and the King has survived far longer than any outside observer thought possible. This tenuous stability, however, is compromised by the presence of as many as 15,000 commandos who operate from the East Bank.⁵ Recruited from the 1,000,000 Palestinians, mostly refugees, living in Jordan,⁶ as well as from Palestinian communities throughout the Arab world, the guerrillas have frequently evoked undesired Israeli retaliation, as at Aqaba in April, 1969, and they have occasionally clashed with Jordanian troops. A particularly severe incident occurred in Amman in November, 1968, when a small commando group fought with Jordanian security forces. According to

² For budget figures, see the *Middle East Economic Digest*, vol. 13, January 24, 1969, p. 116, and the *Economic Review of the Arab World* (Beirut), vol. 3, January, 1969, p. 9.

³ *Middle East Economic Digest*, vol. 12, June 14, 1968, p. 549.

⁴ *The New York Times*, March 27, 1969, pp. 1-2; the *Washington Post*, March 27, 1969, pp. A1-A8.

⁵ *The New York Times*, July 1, 1969, p. 2.

⁶ As of January 1, 1969, there were 478,369 Palestinian refugees registered in the East Bank with the U.N. Relief and Works Agency; 269,065 were registered in the West Bank. An additional 100,000 Palestinians were receiving some services from U.N.R.W.A., but were not registered with the agency.

King Hussein, 24 civilians and 5 military personnel were killed, and 89 civilians and 8 military personnel were wounded in the several days of fighting.⁷ Other shooting incidents have taken place in the past year.

King Hussein's attempts to "crack down" on the guerrillas have resulted in only temporary accommodations which cannot basically alter the mutual distrust. Some commando groups, in particular the Marxist-oriented Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (P.F.L.P.), simply reject compromise with the Hussein regime: the P.F.L.P. is dedicated not only to the destruction of a Zionist Israel but also to the removal of the Arab monarchies and "reactionary" regimes. On the other hand, Al-Fatah, the leading guerrilla organization, is more moderate in this regard and remains non-ideological in outlook. An increasing number of Jordanian army officers are Palestinians (according to one source as much as one-half the officer corps),⁸ and they are probably less inclined to act against the commandos than the East Bank bedouin soldiers who remain loyal to the King.

In 1969, many political changes reflected the Palace's relationship with the guerrilla movement. Shortly after the November, 1968, incidents, the Cabinet was reshuffled, and several "pro-commando" ministers were dropped.⁹ As Hussein's position has gradually weakened, however, he has been forced to grant wider latitude to the guerrillas, and in February, 1969, the King met with Yasir Arafat, leader of Al-Fatah and head of the Palestine Liberation Organization. A Cabinet shakeup on August 12, 1968, the third major change during the year, led to the

return of Bahjat al-Talhouni as Premier. Talhouni, known for his strong sympathies toward the commandos, had been removed five months earlier, reportedly as an earnest of the King's peaceful intentions, prior to Hussein's state visit to the United States. If Talhouni's appointment reflects Hussein's growing disillusionment with the prospects for a negotiated settlement, the inclusion of eight cabinet members from the occupied West Bank (two of them from Jerusalem) also indicates the gradual shift in political power from the King to the Palestinians. To observers who assert that Hussein is already a "prisoner" of the commandos, the King has replied: "The real truth is that I do not want to control or suppress them."¹⁰ Certainly he could not restrain them at this stage even were he so inclined.

As Hussein has given ground to the commandos, so the Communists have also been allowed a greater measure of political freedom. After ten years of exile, Fuad Nasser, the Jordanian Communist party's Secretary General, was permitted to return home. The Communists, for their part, have ceased calling for the overthrow of the King, and have begun to cooperate with other political elements in the country.¹¹

THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

Not only has the domestic political situation shown exceptional fluidity as the Palestinian community is forged into a nationalist movement, but the international context has also changed considerably. Jordan's relations with the "socialist" Arab states have improved; the government's "pro-Western" posture has been maintained, but with greater difficulty; and there are more frequent contacts with the Communist world. Many of these developments relate to the contest with Israel. Relations with Syria and Iraq remain cool, but the five-year defense pact which King Hussein signed with U.A.R. President Gamal Abdel Nasser just prior to the Six Day War has cemented ties with Egypt, at least for the time being.¹² As an active front in the war with Israel, Jordan is no longer so easily subjected to the vitriolic

⁷ *The New York Times*, November 5, 1968, pp. 1-5; November 6, 1968, p. 4; November 7, 1968, p. 3.

⁸ *The Washington Post*, February 24, 1969, p. A17.

⁹ *The New York Times*, December 27, 1968, p. 2.

¹⁰ Interview with the *London Sunday Times* reprinted in the *Washington Post*, January 19, 1969, p. A15.

¹¹ See Aryeh Yodfat, "The USSR, Jordan, and Syria," *Mizan*, vol. 11, March/April, 1969, pp. 76-77.

¹² Signed on May 30, 1967, the pact established a joint Defense Council and a joint Armed Forces Command.

attacks of Arab "radicals," who once labeled King Hussein as a tool of the imperialists and a friend of the Zionists. Though relations with the commando movement are delicate, the King has publicly proclaimed its right and duty to resist, as long as Israel occupies Arab (i.e., Jordanian) territory, and he has been an effective international spokesman for the rights of the Palestinian community.

Hussein's personal diplomacy has been dominated by a search for diplomatic support (both East and West), military and economic aid, mostly from the United States and Great Britain, and effective political and military coordination with the Arabs of the several battlefronts against the Israelis. The King's three-day visit to Moscow in October, 1967, was a response to the Arab defeat in June and a signal to the West that it had to be more understanding of Jordan or face the consequences. Though the military situation was discussed, only an agreement for cultural and scientific cooperation was signed, and Jordan has so far refused offers of Soviet military equipment. However, an 11-day economic mission to the U.S.S.R. in January, 1969, headed by the Jordanian Minister of Economy, resulted in further agreements for increased trade and Soviet aid for several development projects.

Jordan's reaction to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia reflects the country's growing opening to the left and its recognition that international moral support for the Arab cause comes mainly from the Communist bloc. Premier Talhouni refused to condemn the invasion outright, as he might have done some years earlier, but instead denounced Israel's call for a Soviet withdrawal while Israeli soldiers continued to occupy Arab territories.¹³ Further evidence of Jordan's gradual shift in international alignments is provided by the November, 1968, agreements signed with Rumania covering oil exploration, technical and economic cooperation, and trade and payments; the

60,000-ton phosphate deal concluded with Communist China in January, 1969; the announcement in July, 1969, that diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia would be raised to ambassadorial level; and the Jordanian parliamentary mission to East Berlin, also in July, to review the status of nonexistent relations with East Germany.

Despite her changing attitudes toward the West, Jordan was the only active Arab belligerent in the Six Day War to maintain diplomatic relations with the United States. The importance of these ties is well illustrated by the nearly \$630 million in economic aid (mostly grants) which the United States provided Jordan between 1946 and 1967. (In 1967, United States aid totaled \$67 million.) However, in January, 1968, the United States Agency for International Development announced the termination of all budgetary support to Jordan, citing as reasons the Khartoum grants and Jordan's more than \$200 million in foreign exchange reserves.

This action has markedly cooled United States-Jordanian relations, although many Jordanians still view the United States as a friend. The King has made several trips to Washington since June, 1967, and at the conclusion of his latest visit in April, 1969, the United States government "reaffirmed its support for the political independence and territorial integrity" of Jordan.¹⁴ However, occasional verbal support has not led to concrete United States diplomatic efforts on Jordan's behalf. The United States has failed to place meaningful pressure on Israel either for Israeli withdrawal from Jordanian lands or for return of the 300,000 refugees made homeless by the 1967 war, and it has refused to vote in the U.N. Security Council against Israel's annexation of Arab Jerusalem (though ostensibly the United States opposes annexation). Growing Jordanian anger at this approach is evidenced by the recent demonstrations before the United States Embassy in Amman, the grenade attack against the residence of an assistant United States military attaché, and the increasingly bitter denunciations of United States policy

¹³ See the *Middle East Economic Digest*, vol. 12, August 30, 1968, pp. 833-834.

¹⁴ *The New York Times*, April 11, 1969, p. 2.

by Jordanian officials at the United Nations.

PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

What of the future? Can a truncated Jordan survive with the monarchy intact, or will the country gradually slide into chaos as the Palestinian commandos assume greater control over the nation's destiny? No peace settlement is imminent, and the present situation will probably continue for some time. Israel's retention of East Jerusalem is said to be non-negotiable, and Israel will not give up the West Bank without guarantees which are virtually impossible for the Jordanian government to grant. The Jordanians, for their part, will never willingly surrender the West Bank or Jerusalem (although there have been hints that they would consider demilitarization of the West Bank), and any government which did so would probably face immediate overthrow. If another round with Israel does not appear likely, because Jordan no longer "threatens" Israel in any conventional sense, it is still probable that Jordan will continue to play an important role in support of Egyptian military strategy along the Suez Canal.

This is a grim but not hopeless situation. While Jordan's 1968 GNP declined slightly from that of 1967, the 1969 figure is expected to show a modest increase.¹⁵ Since the war, plans have been made for the establishment of a dairy industry; an oil refinery was ordered from Japan; and Jordan's first television station was opened. Amman, whose population has grown to more than 400,000 with the influx of thousands of refugees, is experiencing a construction boom, and businessmen in the capital have shown a certain confidence about the future.¹⁶ Un-

employment, in fact, is not so serious as might have been expected, one reason being the recruitment of substantial numbers of Palestinians into the guerrilla organizations. The port of Aqaba, Jordan's only outlet to the sea, has been modernized to handle ships of 100,000 dead-weight tons, and an international airport is being planned for that city. In addition, several irrigation dams were completed in 1969. Although substantial losses in agricultural production have occurred, up to 30,000 farmers continue to harvest crops in the Jordan Valley, regardless of repeated Israeli-Jordanian clashes in the area and Israel's sabotage (on several occasions) of the vital East Ghor Canal.

In spite of the war, then, life in Transjordan goes on. Were it not for the massive refugee problem (which cannot be solved by Jordan alone), and assuming that subsidies from the wealthy Arab states are continued, a tolerable if not prosperous existence might be possible for Jordan, reduced now to her pre-1948 frontiers.¹⁷ The outlook for occupied Jordan, however, is less clear. The Israeli annexation of East Jerusalem, contrary to several Security Council resolutions, has already led to the economic, political and, in some cases, even physical dislocation of about 70,000 Jordanian citizens.

As for the West Bank, its incorporation into Israel, as some Israelis urge, would mean the severance of its natural ties with the Arab world and the alienation of more than 600,000 Arabs. Its establishment as a Palestinian national entity, which other Israelis have at times suggested, would probably mean the creation of yet another economically unviable state, dependent on foreign support even more than Jordan herself, and politically vulnerable to charges of collusion with Israel.

(Continued on page 49)

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¹⁵ Current price GNP for 1968 has been estimated at \$567 million, down from \$575 million in 1967. Prior to the Six Day War, Jordan's economy had been growing at the rate of 9-10 per cent per year. Due to the partial loss of West Bank markets, political uncertainties and increased military expenditures, it is doubtful whether this remarkable growth rate can be established in the near future.

¹⁶ See *The New York Times*, March 24, 1969, and "Jordan Continues Revival," *International Commerce*, vol. 75, August 11, 1969, pp. 22-24.

¹⁷ See for example, I. W. J. Hopkins, "Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan—What is its Future?" *Contemporary Review*, Fall, 1968, vol. 212, pp. 78-81.

In 1969, "... while her politicians maneuvered, Lebanon's sovereignty was endangered by both the internal challenge of the Arab guerrilla movement and the external threat of an attack by Israeli armed forces."

Shadow on Lebanon

BY JOHN B. WOLF

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MOTIVATED by the hope of profit, Lebanon anxiously awaits the restoration of peace in the Middle East because present tensions threaten her national security and economic prosperity. Regarding their country as the "Switzerland of the Middle East," Lebanese have been famous as adroit traders since the Phoenician era when their coastal cities were established on the narrow strip of shore which separates the mountains of Lebanon from the Mediterranean Sea.

However, the land needed to feed a great state was never available, since the coastal cities were barred from expansion by other powers in the hinterland and to the south. Yet, because they stood in the path of all traffic between Egypt and the North, these Lebanese cities were always open to international influences.¹ Consequently, today as always, the Lebanese are more concerned and involved with the intricacies of commerce than with the intrigues of political relations between states. They are a sophisticated people who savor the niceties of French culture imported to them during the years when Lebanon was ruled as a mandate of France. Business and professional activity in the capital city of Beirut is dominated by Christians and it is predominantly these people who

have a French taste. Three of Beirut's leading newspapers are printed in French and its best restaurants serve French cuisine.² But Lebanon's Muslims, who generally live in the countryside, identify with the objectives of Arab nationalism, support the activities of Lebanese-based Palestinian commandos and deplore their previous encounter with European colonialism.

Today, Lebanon is a participating parliamentary democracy with an economic system that can be compared to nineteenth century French capitalism with complete "laissez faire." The country is a refuge for persons, ideas and capital that are not safe anywhere else in the Arab world. Since the key to the system is money, prosperous businessmen—who fled with their funds when the Egyptian and Iraqi monarchies were toppled—found sanctuary, opportunity and superb banking facilities in Lebanon. Wealthy oil princes from the Persian Gulf sheikdoms also invest heavily in Beirut real estate, and excess capital from all over the Arab world is funneled into the country; as in Swiss banking operations, no questions are asked. Because of this financial activity, more than 90 banking firms are now doing business in the country, including some major United States banks, and Beirut is an important conduit for trade, ranking after London and Zurich as a center for gold trading. The funds brought into Lebanon are put to work in the form of loans to merchants, in financing apartment and hotel construction along the country's attrac-

¹ Sabatino Moscati, *Ancient Semitic Civilizations* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1960), pp. 99-116.

² Thomas F. Brady, "Beirut Leads Area's Boom," *The New York Times*, March 6, 1966, p. 49.

tive seashore, and in the extension of transportation facilities.³

ECONOMIC ASPECTS

Tourists, also, have discovered Lebanon to be a vacation land "par excellence," particularly Arab travelers who find attractions they cannot discover in their own countries. Consequently, Beirut has replaced Cairo as the tourist capital of the Arab world, for travelers reject the regulations imposed upon their activities by the revolutionary bureaucracy and puritanism of Nasser's Egypt and accept instead the excellent facilities at Beirut's beaches and bistros.⁴ In 1968, about 259,000 tourists passed through Beirut and exchanged their money for almost every conceivable variety of merchandise and service, including currency from almost every country in the world. In addition, Beirut International Airport is conveniently situated for both the tourist and the businessman. Located on the shore of the Mediterranean Sea, some five miles from the center of the capital, the airport can service the world's largest aircraft, including the Boeing 747 jets now under construction, and is presently handling about 100 flights and some 5,000 passengers daily.⁵ Until recently, Beirut was relatively free of the street violence that tends to frighten investors and tourists because the Lebanese, anxious to continue their economic boom based on other people's capital, organized an efficient anti-riot unit after the chaotic internal disorders of 1958.⁶

³ William S. Ellis, "A Phoenician Is Still a Phoenician," *The Reporter*, October 11, 1962, pp. 34-37.

⁴ Peter Mansfield, *Nasser's Egypt* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1965), pp. 158-162.

⁵ A good description of existing facilities and operating conditions at Beirut International Airport can be found in Robert D. McFadden, "Beirut's Airport, Busy and Modern, Serves 35 Lines," *The New York Times*, December 26, 1968, p. 3.

⁶ The anti-riot unit is called Squad 16, a name derived from its telephone number. Principally deployed in Beirut, the squad is composed of a few dozen fierce-looking fellows armed with automatic weapons and equipped to smother a riot while it is still in the stage of heated argument.

⁷ Basic economic information for Lebanon is found in *The Oxford Regional Economic Atlas* (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), and *The Middle East and North Africa 1967-68* (London: Europa Publications Limited, 1967).

Understandably, therefore, the Lebanese seek to preserve a system that has worked until now and strive to keep unblemished the image of their country as an ideally situated sunny land of gentle mountains and pleasant valleys with a relaxed and secure atmosphere. Furthermore, it is imperative that this image of Lebanon be perpetuated. The country must continue to attract foreign capital; otherwise, lacking essential internal sources of strength, its economy will collapse. Among the country's foremost economic weaknesses is a lack of substantial mineral resources and, in spite of intensive prospecting, no oil has yet been found in commercial quantities. Additionally, the Lebanese are unable to feed themselves out of their own agricultural production.

However, their citrus crop is now roughly one-quarter of that of Israel's, and Lebanon's production of grapes and apples has increased rapidly in the last few years. Fruit, therefore, is Lebanon's principle article of export and among her major imports are grain, flour, sheep, cattle and a complete range of industrial raw materials, notably fuel and manufactured goods of all descriptions.⁷

Thus Lebanon, dependent upon foreign capital for continued viability and possessing a perilously low inventory of internal economic power, seeks to avoid a rigid ideological position in the Arab-Israeli controversy (similar to that expressed by Cairo and Damascus) because such a tack would be both untenable and impractical. Yet Lebanon's reliance on foreign investments to sustain her economy, her free-wheeling, free enterprise policies, the growing hostility of her more nationalistic neighbors and her internal politics (which is a curious mixture of religious sectarianism, business acumen, feudalism and guile) have created perils of major proportions and place her territorial integrity and state sovereignty in extreme jeopardy.

BANKING CRISIS

Until the financial crisis of October, 1966, when Lebanon's biggest bank, the Intra Bank, closed its doors because it lacked enough cash to meet depositors' withdrawals, it seemed as

if no one cared about banking practices. Previously, banks often skated on thin ice because call money, due on short notice, went into long-term investments that required years to amortize. This seems to have been what happened to Intra, because it had long-term assets to cover short-term obligations. But a series of separate acts by foreign investors also combined in a devastating chain that forced Intra to close and uncovered the weak foundation of Lebanon's banking structure. Great Britain, disappointed when Intra-owned Middle East Airline (M.E.A.) refused to purchase British aircraft, contributed to the crisis when she pressured Kuwait into transferring funds away from Intra and into her own banks to bolster the pound. Thereafter the Soviet Union, perhaps interested in aggravating a situation in a state not completely in accord with its political approach, had its Beirut-based Narodny Bank withdraw the \$5 million it had deposited with Intra.

Next, two Beirut newspapers, leaning editorially toward the socialist Arab states, accused Saudi Arabia and King Faisal of provoking the financial crisis, recalling the King's criticism of Lebanon for abandoning her neutrality in inter-Arab feuds. Incensed by the accusation, according to one account, the King's brother, Mishal, withdrew \$7 million from the Intra Bank in one day; then Kuwaiti deposits totaling nearly \$15 million were pulled out. However, another account mentions that the Saudi money was withdrawn in an effort to coerce Lebanon into joining an anti-Nasser pact proposed by King Faisal and Kuwaiti funds came out because Beirut refused to grant special traffic rights to the Kuwait Airways. Regardless of which

account is accurate, the Intra Bank, holding 38 per cent of the country's deposits, closed and a disabling shortage of cash followed.⁸

The specter of an economic crisis cast its shadow on Beirut's glittering superficial prosperity; merchants were forced to conduct their activities on a full cash basis and circulating reports spoke of a steady flight of capital from the city's banks. Any official confirmation of the flight of money was considered likely to plunge Lebanon into disarray and ruin her economy. Thus, on October 28, 1966, Lebanon's Premier Abdullah Yafi announced that he had instructed the security services to arrest any person circulating false reports about the banking situation. He also asked Parliament for extraordinary powers to pay off depositors without any detailed legislation concerning the method of payment.

After a two-month shutdown, Intra reopened in mid-December, 1966, by borrowing \$45 million and persuading major depositors to pledge to keep another \$90 million in the bank for three years. In January, 1967, the Lebanese Parliament passed a law permitting the gradual liquidation of Intra's assets which saved it from bankruptcy. Furthermore, additional legislation, promising to reorganize the affairs of all banks, was proposed by Parliament and the government, trying to demonstrate that Intra's default had not damaged the Lebanese economy, released statistics showing that the total foreign assets of Lebanon, public and private, exceeded foreign liabilities by nearly three times.⁹

"CONFESSIONAL" POLITICS

The banking crisis was, however, a contributing factor in forcing the resignation of Premier Yafi in December, 1966. Described by some Lebanese as the most unlucky Premier to hold office in a long time, Yafi took office in April, 1966. Shortly thereafter, Lebanon was staggered by twelve strikes in three months and in October it was stunned by the financial crisis. Rashid Karami, an Arab nationalist favoring cooperation with Cairo (but not at the expense of Lebanese identity) formed a new Cabinet,

⁸ The circumstances surrounding the Intra Bank crisis are described in various accounts reported by *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, October 24, 1966, p. 12-A and Thomas F. Brady, "Beirut Bank Failure May End Freewheeling Ways," *The New York Times*, November 4, 1966, p. 3. Aspects of the international intrigue enveloping the situation are described in "Middle East—How They Broke the Bank," *Time*, November 25, 1966, p. 116.

⁹ "Lebanon—Back Toward Business," *Time*, December 23, 1966, p. 69, and Thomas F. Brady, "Intra Bank Helped By Parliament Vote," *The New York Times*, January 11, 1967, p. 6.

Like all Lebanese Premiers, serving under the country's unwritten Constitution that rests on a 1932 French-conducted census, he is a Sunni (Orthodox) Muslim. The 1932 census showed that a slight majority of Lebanon's population at that time was Christian. Consequently, upon independence from France in 1943, an unwritten agreement (called the National Pact) provided for an intricate balance of power between Lebanon's religious and racial groups. It was understood that the Christians would not try to push Lebanon too close to the West and that the Muslims would not seek unity with any Arab state. Lebanon's political system has since rested upon a sectarian division of offices and benefits (e.g., the President is to be a Maronite Christian, the Premier a Sunni Muslim, the Speaker of Parliament a Shi'i Muslim, and so forth). This system perpetuates and reinforces a multibloc party system that eases the distribution of power among the various interest groups and maintains a balance among the religious sects. Consequently, since independence, every Lebanese government has been reluctant to undertake a new census for fear that the precarious, elaborate power structure might be shattered.¹⁰

But the influx into Lebanon of about 164,000 Palestinian refugees, most of them Muslim, may upset the system. Although they are considered a separate group of outsiders

and are refused citizenship, the refugees support and encourage Arab guerrilla fighters who launch commando attacks into Israel from their bases in southern Lebanon. During the spring and summer of 1969, the Lebanese army moved to check the guerrilla forays, but in early November, the government and the guerrilla leaders announced a compromise which will allow guerrilla operations from southern bases. Therefore, Lebanon must live with the possibility that a portion of her southern territory may be occupied by the Israeli army. In August, 1969, after a series of Israeli air raids upon guerrilla positions in Lebanon, Israel's Premier Golda Meir, said, "if the Lebanese authorities do not deal with [the guerrillas], we shall have to do it."¹¹

Consequently, the Arab guerrillas threaten to upset Lebanon's quasi-neutral foreign policy that maintains the tenuous balance among her religious sects. While subscribing to the resolution of the Arab League and participating at various Arab "summit" conferences, Lebanon did little to fight Israel in 1948 and 1956 and nothing in 1967. The Lebanese also remember how their political structure came apart in 1958 when civil war swept across their country and former President Camille Chamoun's request for United States military assistance triggered a landing by United States Marines across the beaches south of Beirut. Thus it is not surprising that Lebanon exercises extreme caution in international affairs, especially in those activities that concern Israel.

Reliable reports tell of a dramatic quarrel between Lebanon's Muslim Premier, Karami, and General Emile Bustani, a Christian and the army commander, on the night of June 7, 1967—a quarrel that kept Lebanon out of the Six Day War. Reportedly, Karami ordered Bustani to attack Israel to relieve pressure on the Syrian front. But Bustani, calculating that the Premier's order condemned his army to destruction, refused. Later that night, Lebanon's President Charles Helou patched up the quarrel between the two men, but the Lebanese never opened a front with Israel.¹²

Actually, Lebanon's military inaction was

¹⁰ Descriptions of Lebanon's "confessional" system of politics are found in Nicola A. Ziadek, *Syria and Lebanon* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957), p. 277 and Hisham B. Sharabi, *Nationalism and Revolution in the Arab World* (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1966), pp. 50-51.

¹¹ Premier Meir's speech, reported by the Israeli state radio, appears as "Mrs. Meir Warns Leaders in Beirut," *The New York Times*, August 13, 1969, p. 11. The estimated figure of the number of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon is based on the U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, *Report of The Commissioner General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency For Palestine Refugees In The Near East*, Supplement No. 13 (A16313), July 1, 1965-June 30, 1966, p. 43, Annex I, Table 2.

¹² For reports relevant to the dispute between Mr. Karami and General Bustani, see "Lebanon Army Chief Rejected Order to Move Against Israel," *The New York Times*, June 21, 1967, p. 1, and Sam Pope Brewer, "Lebanese Aide Says Army Chief Didn't Refuse to Fight Israelis," *The New York Times*, June 22, 1967, p. 10.

not inconsistent with her established policy toward Israel. Nothing resembling the "twilight war" that has been fought along Israel's borders with other Arab countries shattered the relative calm of the Lebanese-Israeli frontier until the Palestinian commandos decided to take advantage of the political crisis created by the Israeli raid on Beirut International Airport of December 28, 1968.

In the airport attack, helicopter-borne Israelis destroyed 13 Arab civil airliners at an estimated loss of \$43.1 million. Although there was no loss of life, many Lebanese felt that their country had been wrongly accused. Others refused to accept the Israeli explanation that an attack upon an El Al airliner in Athens by Lebanese-based guerrillas and the hijacking of another Israeli jetliner over Italy by the same group in July, 1968, was enough justification for the reprisal raid. Furthermore, Israel's former Premier, Levi Eshkol, answering criticism, said that "a state cannot harbor and encourage an armed force operating from its territory against a neighboring state and be considered immune from reaction." Practically, the Israeli raid could be viewed also as a warning to the governments of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait (whose airliners use the airport facilities) that continued contributions of large sums to the commando movement might in the future subject their property to Israeli reprisal.¹³

¹³ An account of the attack on the airport is by Dana Adams Schmidt, "Israelis Attack Beirut's Airport; Wreck 13 Planes," *The New York Times*, December 29, 1968, p. 1. Premier Eshkol's comments, spoken over the Israeli state radio, are reported by James Feron, "Eshkol on Radio Defends Attacks," *The New York Times*, December 30, 1968, p. 8.

¹⁴ Among the best accounts of Arab guerrilla operations since the end of the Six Day War are: Michael Hudson, "The Palestinian Arab Resistance Movement: Its Significance in the Middle East Crisis," *The Middle East Journal*, Summer, 1969, pp. 291-307; Amnon Rubinstein, "A year after the six-day war, Israel still finds that In Victory There Is No Peace," *The New York Times Magazine*, June 2, 1968, pp. 32-42, and "The Guerrilla Threat In The Middle East," *Time*, December 13, 1968, pp. 29-36.

¹⁵ The Al Fatah charges and demands are reported by Dana Adams Schmidt, "Al Fatah Demands Beirut Give Guerrillas Freedom of Action," *The New York Times*, April 26, 1969, p. 3 and Mr. Karami's statement is reported by the same journalist as "Lebanon Premier Resigns In Clash," *The New York Times*, April 25, 1969, p. 1.

Immediately after the attack, Lebanon tried to bar guerrilla operations from her soil, but the major groups (e.g., Al Fatah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine) continued to maintain offices in Beirut and support operations in the south of the country. Ineffectual Lebanese countermeasures seemed to make the Arab guerrilla movement appear more credible because they aroused increasingly favorable commando sentiment in the country.¹⁴ On April 23, 1969, Lebanon declared a state of emergency, after seven persons had been killed and scores injured in clashes between security forces and Palestinian refugees and students protesting restrictions on guerrillas. After the violent outbreak, a strict curfew was ordered for Beirut by the military command, which has been in charge of Lebanon's security since the Israeli attack on the airport. But Al Fatah radio, broadcasting from Cairo, charged that counterrevolutionary forces had tried to halt the revolution in Lebanon by utilizing brutal security methods to maintain order.

Severe criticism of Premier Karami's efforts to repress demonstrations against the government's restrictions on Palestinian guerrillas forced his resignation and prompted him to make one of the frankest statements of the alternatives facing Lebanon ever made by a Lebanese political leader. Karami said that there were two views of Lebanon's possible policies. First, he said, "we could allow commando activity regardless of consequences"; contrarily, he continued, "there are those whose view is that the commandos represent a danger to Lebanon in their activities." Another statement by Karami amounted to a proposal for the formation of a national coalition that would embrace all political elements including leading representatives of the political left-wing and right-wing Christian groups.¹⁵

By the end of April, 1969, Arab guerrilla organizations had gained such widespread support for their cause among the Lebanese people that a warning by Pierre Jumayyil, leader of the Phalangist party (Lebanon's largest political organization) went unheeded. Jumayyil cautioned that Israel might try to

occupy part of south Lebanon unless the guerrillas were restrained.¹⁶

GUERRILLA OPERATIONS

In early May, a series of armed encounters occurred between guerrillas and Lebanese troops as the army tried to encircle guerrilla bases in the foothills west of Mount Hermon, which is located in the corner of Lebanon between Syria and Israel. This deteriorating situation was responsible for the convening of a conference in Beirut on May 9, 1969. At the conference Premier Designate Karami, who had been asked to form a new government, and Yasser Arafat, head of the Palestine Liberation Organization, heard President Helou reiterate his view that as a sovereign state Lebanon could never allow a military force of outsiders to operate across her borders without the express consent of the government. However, before leaving Beirut, Arafat was told that the Lebanese would tolerate a guerrilla presence inside their country but would not allow commando operations against Israel. Nonetheless, on June 24, President Helou demanded the complete withdrawal of the commandos, stating that their presence invited an Israeli attack.¹⁷

These were prophetic remarks. On August 11, Israel launched an air strike against commando bases in southern Lebanon, from which bases attacks continued to be launched against Israel. Commenting on the action, Israel's Premier Golda Meir said that the raid

¹⁶ "Lebanese Political Leader Asks Head of Al Fatah to Mediate Policy Dispute," *The New York Times*, April 27, 1969, p. 25.

¹⁷ "Will the Commandos Leave?" *Arab News and Views*, Vol. XV, No. 7, July, 1969, pp. 3-4 and Dana Adams Schmidt, "Fatah Chief Departs After Lebanon Refuses to Open Border to Guerrillas," *The New York Times*, May 13, 1969, p. 15.

¹⁸ "Mrs. Meir Warns Leaders in Beirut," *The New York Times*, August 13, 1969, p. 11.

¹⁹ For the text of a letter addressed by the Secretary General to the Permanent Representatives of Israel and Lebanon, see *U.N. Security Council, Official Records, Document #S/9393*, August 18, 1969. For the Lebanese reply to the Secretary General's letter see *U.N. Security Council Official Records, Document #S/9393, Add. 1*, August 18, 1969. The Israeli position can be found in *U.N. Security Council Official Records, Document #S/9393 Add. 2*, August 25, 1969.

²⁰ John K. Cooley, "U.N. Debate Stirs Lebanese Issue," *The Christian Science Monitor*, August 19, 1969, p. 2.

was aimed at the guerrillas, not at Lebanon.¹⁸ After the attack, the United Nations Security Council debated a Lebanese complaint regarding the Israeli air raid. Secretary General U Thant, noting that since June, 1967, there had been no effective U.N. observation along the Israel-Lebanon frontier, proposed that U.N. observers be positioned on both sides of the border.¹⁹

However, Lebanese political factions differed sharply over the Secretary General's proposal. Karami opposed the idea of a U.N. observation group. But leaders of the conservative "tripartite alliance," consisting of former President Camille Chamoun, Raymond Edde and Pierre Jumayyil, oppose commando operations from bases in Lebanon and implicitly support the Secretary General's proposal. Furthermore, some Lebanese believe that the guerrilla issue is being used only as a pretext to open the political campaign for the 1970 presidential election, when Parliament must select a successor to President Helou. One likely candidate is former President Camille Chamoun. On August 15, he said, "We have faced our internal problems with negligence, ignorance and demagoguery instead of making the right diagnosis and prescribing the right remedy."²⁰

But while her politicians maneuvered, Lebanon's sovereignty was endangered by both the internal challenge of the Arab guerrilla movement and the external threat of an attack by Israeli armed forces. With Israel increasingly impatient, Lebanese leaders will have to take some kind of action soon. They could direct their army to crush the guerrillas. But the backlash of such an action would convulse the country, and there is a possibility that Lebanon's 25,000-man army could not do the job. Yet the shadow on Lebanon will not vanish until the guerrillas withdraw from

(Continued on page 49)

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"With respect to questions involving Yemen and South Arabia, the League of Arab States appears to have been gradually subverted by the United Arab Republic."

Aden and South Arabia

By ROY E. THOMAN

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ALTHOUGH FREQUENTLY overshadowed by the explosive Arab-Israeli conflict, revolutionary changes are taking place in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf areas, changes which have profound political significance. In 1962, revolutionaries led by General Abdullah al-Sallal, and aided by Egyptian troops, began a long and bitter civil war to end the ancient rule of the Imams in Yemen. Five years later, in late 1967, in defiance of the departing British colonial authorities, traditional elements and more moderate political groups, the National Liberation Front seized control of neighboring Aden and South Arabia. The area was renamed Southern Yemen, and Qahtan al-Shaabi, leader of the N.L.F., became the first President. On the opposite shore of the Red Sea, a leftist group sympathetic to U.A.R. President Gamal Abdel Nasser took over Sudan on May 25, 1969. As British power retreats from the Persian Gulf area, the future looms more and more grim for traditional rulers in Muscat and Oman, the Trucial States and Qatar. Ominously, a clandestine revolutionary organization has already been formed which is called the Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf.*

The revolutionary changes taking place in the Arab Middle East are not random phenomena; rather, a pattern is distinguishable. First, when there is conflict between an Arab

state (or states) and an outside (non-Arab) state, there is a tendency toward Arab unity. Second, when the disagreement is confined to internal Arab problems, unity is more difficult to achieve. Third, in a conflict between Arab traditionalists and Arab leftist-revolutionaries, the latter are more likely to receive support from the Arab League. Fourth, in revolutionary struggles in the Arab world, the Arab League often becomes a useful tool for the implementation of Nasser's foreign policies.

YEMEN AND THE PROTECTORATES

The dispute between the Imams of Yemen and the British had existed ever since the latter had occupied Aden and South Arabia in 1839. For a variety of reasons, the Yemenis could not accept this intrusion of British sovereignty. To their way of thinking "al-Yemen" included not only what is today called "Yemen," but also Aden Colony and the Aden Protectorate. This claim was based partly on the religious belief that all al-Yemen should be under Zeidi rule,** and also on historical evidence that under Qasim the Great and his heirs the Imamate had actually extended over all al-Yemen.

A treaty signed with Great Britain in 1934 did little to clarify the tangled web of claims and counterclaims. Briefly stated, the treaty provided that the status quo of 1934 between Yemen and the Protectorates would be preserved for 40 years. The British meant to guarantee that the frontier between Yemen

* For nationalistic reasons, the Arabs call the Persian Gulf the "Arabian" Gulf.

** Ed. note: The Zeidis are an Islamic sect.

and the Protectorates would not be altered for the duration of the treaty. The Imam, on the other hand, understood the treaty to mean that political arrangements in the area protected by the British would not be changed during the life of the treaty.

In the late 1940's, British advisers began to exercise more and more authority over the rulers of states in the Protectorate. In light of the Imam's historical claims to the area and his interpretation of the 1934 treaty, it is understandable why this activity on the part of Great Britain was regarded as a further encroachment upon his "rights," as well as a violation of the treaty.

Seeking support for his position, the Imam asked for, and received, the formal backing of the Arab League Council.

In June, 1946, the League passed the following resolution:

The Council pledges its support to Yemen in its stand towards the Protectorates disputed with the British Government and concerning which an agreement was concluded but whose discussion was postponed until friendly negotiations are held in the future between Yemen and the British Government in conformity with the treaty concluded between them.¹

Another resolution was approved on April 1, 1950. (The attempt at negotiations mentioned in the resolution resolved nothing.)

The Committee took note of the developments of the Anglo-Yemeni talks and of the intention for entering upon direct negotiations to be held in London soon at a date to be agreed upon by the two parties. The Council, meanwhile, hails this step and hopes that the forthcoming negotiations will result in the settlement of the problems which the member states are interested in solving in such a manner *that would reserve to Yemen its lawful rights*. The Council further recommends the Arab League member states to exert their efforts, each as it deems fit, for the success of these negotiations and the attainment of an amicable and satisfactory settlement.²

¹ Resolution 64/Session 4/Meeting 5—June 1, 1946.

² Resolution 291/Session 12/Meeting 4—April 1, 1950. Italics mine.

³ Resolution 753/Session 21/Meeting 3—April 31, 1955. Italics mine.

⁴ Resolution 1377/Session 27/Meeting 8—September 4, 1957. Italics mine.

By the middle of the 1950's, many of the rulers in the Protectorate, as well as the British government, were of the opinion that further political and economic progress was being hindered by the lack of useful political institutions. In January, 1954, and again in March, 1956, the rulers met at the invitation of the Governor of Aden to discuss closer association.

In an attempt to head off adverse political developments in the Protectorate, the Arab League dispatched a mission to Yemen in 1954. Having studied the report submitted by this mission, the League Council passed a resolution on April 31, 1955, which read in part:

3. The Council of the League of Arab States *reaffirms its full support to Yemen in its lawful stand towards the question of the Southern Territories*. . . .

5. The Council appeals to the Sultans and Heads of the Southern and Eastern Territories of Yemen not to get involved, *as it is not wanted for them to cooperate with any agreement or any system that would violate their nationalist and Arab spirit and alienate them from their Arab brothers, particularly Yemen*.

6. The Council reaffirms its willingness to extend in collaboration with Yemen all the necessary assistance that would bolster their resistance and preserve their Arab entity. . . .³

One is impressed by the militant tone of the resolution, as well as the warning to Protectorate rulers not to collaborate with British colonialism.


The "Yemeni South" issue was again taken up in September, 1957:

The Council decides to approve the following recommendation passed by the Political Affairs Committee.

"The Committee . . . condemns the criminal British aggression on the Yemeni South and *reaffirms its support to the lawful struggle of Yemen to liberate all its territories* and ensure the safety of its people and,

Recommends the member states to continue their efforts at the international gatherings with a view to achieve the lawful demands of Yemen."⁴

A major development in "nation-building" took place in February, 1959, when six of the states of the Western Aden Protectorate



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Original Members of the Arab League

(For 1970 borders and names of modern states, see page 7.)

set up a Federation of Arab Emirates of the South. At the same time a treaty of friendship and mutual cooperation was signed with Great Britain which pledged that Britain would assist the federation to develop ultimately into a politically independent state. By the fall of 1962, the Federation of South Arabia, as it had been renamed in May, 1962, consisted of 11 states. In January, 1963, Aden joined the Federation and by the end of 1965 the total membership had risen to 17 states. Even though the three states making up the Eastern Protectorate had not joined the federation it was clear to everyone that a new, independent state would soon be born in South Arabia and that imamic ambitions were being thwarted.

Meanwhile, Yemen had joined the United Arab Republic in 1958 to form a loose federation called the United Arab States. With the Yemeni Army under the command of Egyptian Field-Marshal Hakim Amer, intensification of pressure on Aden and the Protectorates was feared. A large supply of Soviet military equipment, including self-propelled guns, had already been delivered to be used if called upon.⁵

The British Governor of Aden, Sir William Luce, referred to these two developments in a speech delivered in April, 1958. These two events, he said, meant that

we have now on our doorstep two powerful influences, both hostile, and we must assume that both Russia and Egypt will support and exploit the long-standing ambition of the Imam to secure Yemeni domination of both the Aden Protectorate and colony. We have begun to see the effects of Russian arms, and the nature of frontier disturbances has changed from skirmishing by tribesmen with rifles to attacks across the frontier by artillery, mortars, and heavy automatic weapons.⁶

Continued Aden-Yemeni frontier incidents led to an effort in 1959 to enter into negotiations. On May 18, the Yemeni Minister of

State arrived in Aden to begin discussions, but little was accomplished; talks broke off before the end of the month. The Yemenis had objected to the inclusion in the Aden delegation of four rulers of the federated emirates. Before its delegation left Taiz, the Yemen government had agreed that the Aden delegation would include rulers of the emirates. Nevertheless, the Yemeni Minister of State refused to enter into negotiations with any Aden delegation which included the rulers on the ground that to do so would imply Yemeni recognition of the Federation.⁷ In the same year there was additional support from the League of Arab States for Yemen to annex South Arabia and Aden, with the League Council deciding:

1. to condemn the British acts of aggression on the Occupied and Non-Occupied Yemeni South which are in violation of British pledges and of international law, as well as the provisions of the U.N. Charter;
2. to pledge support to the stand taken by the Kingdom of Yemen and to its right to retrieve the southern occupied part of its territory, and
3. to instruct the Arab Delegations at the U.N. General Assembly's 14th session to draw attention to the danger of British imperialism in the Arab Peninsula.⁸

REVOLUTION IN YEMEN

Just one month before the Yemeni revolution of 1962, the Yemen Legation in London had an occasion to reiterate the Imam's historic claims to "the southern part of al-Yemen." The statement, provoked by an announcement that the Colony of Aden was to join the Federation of South Arabia, maintained that any measures which the British government might have taken "to disrupt such existing unity and to effect any such change by so-called legal negotiations" revealed the British intention to prolong and strengthen Britain's hold on the area.

The Government and people of Yemen reserve the right to consider the resolutions of the London conference null and void, and not to recognize any change that would constitute a deviation from the treaty between the Yemen Government and the British Government.⁹

The house of Hamid Ed-Din was soon en-

⁵ Editorial, *The Times* (London), April 21, 1958, p. 9.

⁶ *The Times* (London), April 28, 1958, p. 8.

⁷ *The Times* (London), June 2, 1959, p. 10.

⁸ Resolution 1597/Session 32/Meeting 4—September 7, 1959. Italics mine.

⁹ *The Times* (London), August 18, 1962, p. 5.

gulfed in problems at home that dwarfed violation of claims to the south. The Yemen revolution started on September 26, 1962, and from that time the dynasty was fighting for its very existence.

In retrospect, the decision of Imam Ahmed to join with the U.A.R. to form the United Arab States and to permit entry into Yemen of elements of the Egyptian military proved to be a fatal mistake. In his zeal to acquire a war machine to counter British power in South Arabia, the Imam had unwittingly introduced into his country a subversive force which, given the opportunity, turned on his successor, Imam Muhammad al-Badr.

This is not the place to recapitulate the history of the civil war between the Yemeni republicans and royalists. But the impact of the conflict upon regional politics should be mentioned.

The Yemeni republicans, with the help of thousands of Egyptian troops, were soon in control of the major cities, along with much of the territory of Yemen. When accounts of what was happening to the north reached Aden, the Aden Trades Union Congress and the People's Socialist party took up the revolution in Yemen as if it were their own. They spoke of Aden and Yemen as being practically one. The declared aim of these anti-traditionalists was the complete unification of Yemen on the basis of socialism.¹⁰

The British government refused to recognize the republican regime. That refusal provoked the Yemenis to break off relations and to appoint a Minister of State for "South Yemen Affairs." Thus, the old Zeidi claims to the "southern part of al-Yemen" were taken up by the new regime.

In March, 1963, President Sallal called for revolt in South Arabia. Speaking on a Sana Radio broadcast, he said:

. . . You, my brothers in the South, teach the British. Your brothers up north revolted and achieved a miracle. . . . Our forces have entered Harib town after a month and a half of fierce fighting against the British. . . . Oh broth-

ers in the south, I urge you to revolt and take revenge against the British.¹¹

By this time the traditional rulers in the South Arabian Federation were becoming alarmed. Their ultimate objective was an independent country in South Arabia, under their domination, with British defense guarantees. They sought to curb the growing influence of the modernist-leftist groups, and they wanted to prevent a merger with the revolutionary Yemeni state to the north.

The growing tension between revolutionary and traditionalist forces in the Arab world was reflected in the Arab League Council's resolution of May 19, 1964. The anti-traditionalist tone would become more pronounced in later resolutions.

. . . The Council deplores the brutal British aggression and the war of extermination exercised by the British imperialist troops against the national strugglers in defiance of the U.N. Charter, principles and resolutions, as well as the sacred right of people to self-determination.

It emphasizes that the British build-up and the imperialist base of Aden constitute a direct threat to the security and safety of the Arab states and all the Afro-Asian countries, in addition to their threat to world peace, thus making it incumbent upon all countries to cooperate with a view to eliminating this threat and stemming its sources.

The Council warns Britain of the consequences of her persistence in executing her imperialist schemes and misleading intrigues as represented by her recent call for the convocation of the London Conference next June with the purpose of securing the continuation of the British presence *through the imposition of false institutions against the will of the citizens and the disintegration of the Arab region.*

The Council decides:

Firstly, that the Arab member states should hasten to provide every possible aid as soon as possible for the liberation of the Occupied Yemeni South.

Secondly, that the Arab countries should conduct immediately direct contact with all countries, particularly the Afro-Asian ones, *to positively contribute to the consolidation of the just revolution in the Occupied Yemeni South.* . . .¹²

As the most important traditionalist country in the Arab world, Saudi Arabia was deeply concerned with events in neighboring Yemen and South Arabia. King Faisal saw

¹⁰ *The Times* (London), October 1, 1962, p. 10.

¹¹ *The Times*, (London), March 8, 1963, p. 10.

¹² Resolution of May 19, 1964 (No further citation available). Italics mine.

in Egyptian aid to the revolutionaries an attempt to gain a base for the spread of Nasserite revolution throughout the Arabian Peninsula. Consequently, Faisal's government provided considerable amounts of supplies and money to the Yemeni royalists to carry on the civil war. In retaliation, the Egyptian Air Force periodically bombed Saudi Arabian frontier towns that served as supply points for the royalists. Most often hit were the towns of Jizan and Najran.

The affinity of the traditional rulers in South Arabia for Saudi Arabia was shown in November, 1966, when a number of South Arabian Federal Ministers traveled to Jeddah to discuss with King Faisal the kind of support he was prepared to give the federal government before and after independence. Faisal had stated that a certain amount of economic support for an independent South Arabia could be expected.

In May, 1967, King Faisal began a state visit to Great Britain to discuss the Middle East situation with British Prime Minister Harold Wilson. On this occasion Faisal echoed the anxiety of the South Arabian Federal government that unless Britain extend defense guarantees, along with independence, to Aden and South Arabia the area would probably fall victim to both aggression and subversion.

The more recent Arab League resolutions pertaining to South Arabia have a pro-revolutionary tone. The United Arab Republic seemed to be making its influence felt to the injury of Saudi Arabian national interests. The republicans in Yemen and the nationalists in South Arabia were receiving support at the expense of the royalists in Yemen and the traditionalist-oriented Federal Government.

On March 21, 1965, the Council passed the following resolution.

The Council decides to approve the following recommendation of the Political Affairs Committee:

"The Political Affairs Committee has reviewed

¹³ Resolution 2105/Session 43/Meeting 2—March 21, 1965. Italics mine.

¹⁴ Resolution of May 26, 1965 (No further citation available). Italics mine.

the memorandum of the General Secretariat concerning the contacts that have taken place to *step up the national struggle in the Occupied South* and concert the efforts of national organizations, and recommends the following:

1. that the sub-committee continues its endeavors to *unify the efforts of the nationalists in the Occupied South*;
2. that the military secretariat should work out a draft plan for consolidating the armed struggle in the area. . . .¹³

The resolution of May 26, 1965, was even more militantly pro-revolutionist, declaring that:

1. The committee formed at the League should follow up the endeavors to unify the efforts of the nationalists in the Occupied South on the following bases:
 - a. The establishment of a single organization for both military and political action comprising the national bodies in the Occupied South to whose charter and statutes all parties should be committed.
 - b. A single fund for this organization should be created at the League with voluntary contributions from the member states to fulfill the organization's objectives in liberating the Occupied South.
2. Until such an organization is established, the member states should extend their financial and material assistance to the nationalists and to the relief of those who take refuge in the Yemeni Arab Republic as a result of the British aggressive acts against the nationalist movement. . . .¹⁴

Not surprisingly, the delegation of Saudi Arabia expressed reservations on the second clause of the first item, as well as the second item of this resolution.

In the resolution of March 18, 1967, for the first time, the Egyptian-backed Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY) is mentioned.

Having reviewed the situation in Aden and the Occupied South in all its aspects and after taking note of the latest developments of the colonialist policy which aims at maintaining aggressive colonialism and at renouncing previous pledges by the British Government to evacuate the area and recognize its independence, the Council of the League of Arab States at its 47th ordinary session decides to:

1. Condemn British colonialism and hold it fully responsible for the assassination of national-

ists, particularly during the recent period, and for the atrocious crimes it has committed which have been condemned by world conscience everywhere.

2. Hail the Arab people in Aden and the Occupied South in their struggle against British colonialism for the attainment of their freedom and sovereignty. . . .

3. Give maximum support to the Arab struggle in the area against colonialism and its agents and consolidate it by all material, moral, and human means. . . .

5. *Pledge support to the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY) in its struggle, and to extend all material and moral assistance to it, being the legitimate frame of the struggle of the people of the area.*

6. Denounce the attempts of the British colonialist government and those who cooperate with it which aim at hindering the withdrawal of the British authorities in 1968 and the liquidation of military bases in the area.¹⁵

Naturally, the head of the Saudi delegation objected to the fifth clause.

Thus, with respect to questions involving Yemen and South Arabia, the League of Arab States appears to have been gradually subverted by the United Arab Republic. King Faisal responded by cutting off Saudi Arabia's important financial contributions for a number of League projects. In his disillusionment with the organization he decided to bypass it in favor of summit diplomacy and direct recourse to the United Nations.

What did Nasser gain from his increasing influence over the Arab League? First, a degree of legitimization was provided for certain of his foreign policies, such as his support for FLOSY. Nations often seek to legitimize their foreign policies by having such policies accepted by some multistate organization. (For example, in 1950 the United States regarded endorsement of its Korean policy by the United Nations as a major diplomatic victory.) In addition, Nasser was able to obtain some added financial support for his policies by using the Arab League.

There is reason to believe that Nasser's maximum objective with respect to the southern Arabian peninsula called for a victory

by the Yemeni republicans, led by Sallal, over the royalists. In Aden, his maximum strategy called for the victory of the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen over the sheiks and sultans and such nationalist groups as the National Liberation Front. Sallal's republicans and FLOSY, having vanquished their respective enemies, would then form one enlarged political unit, perhaps a state called the "United Yemeni Republic."

The next step would call for the possible incorporation of such a "United Yemeni Republic" into the United Arab Republic. Perhaps the former would then be known as the "southern province" of the U.A.R. From this foothold in the Arabian peninsula, Nasser's forces would be able to put pressure on Faisal's Saudi Arabia and on the traditionalist oil-producing states to the east of Aden. Also, of geopolitical importance, Nasser would be in control of the southern entrance to the Red Sea. In a limited sense, by having control of both the northern and southern ends of the Red Sea, Nasser would hope to turn that highway of commerce into an "Egyptian lake." Control over Bab El Mandeb could be used to put added pressure on Israeli shipping.

Several events, however, prevented Nasser from achieving his maximum objectives. First, the National Liberation Front triumphed over the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen. In view of the fact that FLOSY was initially in a stronger position, how did the N.L.F. gain the upper hand? FLOSY's leaders made a number of mistakes. First, they were too closely identified with the U.A.R. Although Nasser commands great respect in the Arab world, FLOSY seemed to have forgotten that nationalism (in the conventional meaning of

(Continued on page 49)

Roy E. Thoman did his doctoral work at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at the University of Kentucky. He held the Kentucky Research Foundation Fellowship, the Haggin Fellowship and the William A. Patterson Fellowship while preparing his dissertation.

¹⁵ Resolution 2295/Session 47/Meeting 3—March 18, 1967. Italics mine.

In discussing the recent coup in Libya, this author points out that "Thus far, the new leadership has not developed any clear set of publicly stated goals and objectives. The regime, to the extent that it exhibits any salient characteristics, appears to be intensely nationalistic, socialist in orientation and inclined towards xenophobia."

Libya: The End of Monarchy

BY WILLIAM H. LEWIS

Former Visiting Professor of Political Science, The University of Michigan

LORD JEFFREY, the founding editor of the *Edinburgh Review*, once observed that "every man who appears before the public appears before a company to whom he owes respect and whose sympathies he ought not to reckon too securely." However, after more than 17 years as political primate of Libya, King Idris had reason to hope that the sympathies of his subjects ran deeply and strongly in his favor.

At independence in December, 1951, Libya faced long odds in her first faltering efforts to establish the foundations of nationhood. Populated largely by pastoralists and peasants (who comprised three-quarters of the 1.2 million inhabitants), the country had few trained technicians, experienced administrators or political chieftains knowledgeable in the arts of modern government. In this essentially rural society the extended family (the clan, the village, or the tribe, rather than the state or its subdivisions) was the touchstone of community. Moreover, Libya had no ruling political party, no overarching national ideology to guide the country's diverse peoples, and no set of common traditions to bind together the tribesmen of Cyrenaica, the town-dwellers of Tripolitania and the nomads of Fezzan.

In the economic realm, Libya had a deficit economy. Agriculture yielded, in most cases, a pitifully small return owing to a combina-

tion of factors including primitive farming methods, poor marketing and distribution systems and inadequate credit facilities. Industry offered even less promising possibilities since there were no known mineral resources or power potentials. Compounding Libya's problems were the distinct qualitative limitations of the country's human resources stemming primarily from lack of education, training and motivation.

THE MONARCHICAL INSTITUTION

King Idris came to power in 1951 with credentials that appeared impeccable. He had long opposed Italian colonial domination from his place of exile in Egypt; he had rallied Cyrenaican forces to the Allied cause during World War II and had subsequently returned to Libya to be reappointed Emir of Cyrenaica in 1949. In the latter capacity, Idris was a tireless exponent of Libyan independence during Four-Power deliberations concerning the disposition of the former Italian territories and during the later period when the United Nations assumed responsibility for the matter. A gentle patrician, Idris also was a claimant to recognition as a religious cleric because of his position as head of the Sanusi brotherhood, a religious confraternity founded in 1842. What made Idris' political primacy inevitable, however, was his acceptability among most Libyan po-

litical factions and competing groups as a compromise candidate, a political figure without any special axes to grind.

As finally promulgated, the Libyan constitution accorded the monarchy a special position in the citadel of power. King Idris al-Mahdial-Sanusi was to select his own chief minister, appoint one-half of the membership of the Senate, introduce or veto legislation and dissolve the lower house of Parliament at his own discretion. The constitution, however, masked the realities of the prevailing scene. Given the frailties of existing institutions, all power naturally moved into the hands of the monarchy and the rudiments of an absolutist system were quickly established.

The distinctive feature of the absolutist system was its isolation from the society at large. The power elite consisted of the King, a small coterie of retainers in the court entourage, and those among his ministers who enjoyed favored status. The latter grouping was fluid in composition, consisting of Cyrenaican loyalists and a handful of Tripoli notables whose enjoyment of the royal pleasure was subject to all the vagaries of a Byzantine court system. A second notable feature was the physical remoteness and detachment of the King, who preferred to remain in Cyrenaica isolated from the daily pressures of government. Gentle and sensitive by nature, Idris was bemused by scholarly and religious pursuits; he left the management of refractory public problems to his Prime Minister, an arrangement that could only end in frustrated mutual unhappiness, and frequently did—witness the succession of chief ministers who followed one another into office for an average stay of less than 18 months.

A third, and perhaps critical, feature of the absolutist system was its lack of viability. The King had produced no male issue, and the question of succession was slightly clouded; the heir-apparent, a relative named Hassan al-Ridha, was a lackluster personality who was not highly regarded by the aging 79-year-old ruler; the King himself had signaled an intention on several occasions to recommend the establishment of a republic

in the event of his demise. Moreover, Idris had several times offered his own demission, most notably during the governmental crises of 1954 and 1964.

Given the fragility of the Idrisid system, its ability to survive for more than 17 years may be difficult to comprehend. Part of the answer undoubtedly was to be found in the fragmented nature of Libyan society. While the ruling elite exhibited agreement on most public issues, the Libyan public lacked consensus. The masses were not mobilized; political parties were totally proscribed; what labor union life existed was carefully controlled by the prevailing oligarchy. The threat of coercion always lurked in the background. Moreover, traditional society was pluralistic—not in the democratic sense but, rather, in divisive terms. Thus, the monarchy could play off competing tribal interests in Cyrenaica, buy off vying merchant groups in Tripoli and Benghazi and harass the irreconcilables. Through these devices the oligarchy controlled the resources of power and influence.

SOCIAL CHANGE: THE ROOTS OF SUBVERSION

Social change can and frequently does give rise to new claimants to elite status and political power. In the case of Libya, the basis for change was to be found in a cloud no bigger than a man's fist. The discovery of oil in 1959 was a historic occasion which confounded most Western oil experts who, only 18 months earlier, had issued the most pessimistic prognoses. However, at "Zeltan No. 1," approximately 100 miles inland from Ras el-Brega on the Bay of Sirte, a major strike was made. In rapid succession, strikes occurred in a number of adjacent areas, and Libya's transitional era was at an end. Providence had been kind to a people in deep distress.

Libya is currently producing 3.5 million barrels per day of petroleum, which places her ahead of Kuwait and only slightly behind Saudi Arabia and Iran. Proven reserves are currently 25 billion barrels but will probably range up to 100 billion ultimately. At

present, the only inhibitions on production are limited pipeline and terminal facilities, as well as unsatisfactory marketing conditions. However, the value of Libyan petroleum has increased with the closure of the Suez Canal in 1967 and the growth of European requirements, especially in Italy and West Germany.

At present, Libya exports more than \$1 billion annually in oil products and has accumulated an overall balance-of-payments surplus of more than \$250 million since 1957. These revenues have had an inflationary impact upon the economy as reflected in price-wage spirals, heavy imports and increases in the costs of goods and services. The somewhat artificial aspects of this growth are reflected in the fact that nearly all food, machinery, raw materials, and skilled and professional labor are obtained from abroad. Expenditures for foreign services (excluding payments to oil companies) rose from \$5 million in 1958 to more than \$55 million in 1968.

These transformations in the Libyan economy were accompanied by dramatic changes in the country's social fabric. In rapid succession, increasing numbers of Libyans were swept up in the oil boom; farm lands were left untended as farmers sought the fruits of new jobs (and a country which was once self-sufficient in food production became a net importer of foodstuffs). The process of urbanization achieved revolutionary dimensions as demands for housing, health services and educational opportunities proliferated. These changes did not proceed smoothly—indeed, if anything, the pace was uneven, and social discontinuities in the form of casual employment and crime served as reminders that social change could be idiosyncratic and destabilizing.

As the process unfolded, the gulf between the traditional ruling elite and the newly emerging social groups widened. Education and exposure to other societies produced a disenchanting educated elite; the oil industry produced a working class which was alienated as a result of the government's interference with union activity and its refusal to permit the formation of a labor party; within the

security services, youthful officers bridled against the favoritism displayed by the Palace for members of the Shalhi and allied families. A new generation was rising, anxious to assume responsible roles, outraged by rampant corruption in the organs of public administration, and determined to reform the policies and programs of the Idrisid regime.

The sense of shock and humiliation which followed the Arab defeat by Israel in June, 1967, fueled the fires of disaffection. The government was increasingly condemned for its continued close association with the United States, an avowed "defender of Israeli interests," and for its permissiveness with regard to continued American access to the giant air base at Wheelus outside Tripoli. Continued Libyan reliance upon British military assistance and sales was also denounced. As the Arab-Israeli sore festered during 1967 and 1968, public resentment against the government's passiveness mounted. At the same time, public support for such commando movements as the fedayeen became pronounced.

THE BAKKUSH ADMINISTRATION

The success with which any political system adapts to far-reaching social change is crucial to its survival. In the case of King Idris, he was increasingly aware that an act of renovation was very much in order if the regime were to be perpetuated. A lengthy procession of mediocre politicians who had assumed the mantle of Prime Minister had given a porridge-like quality to Libyan politics. The period when a mandarinat of lethargic politicians could rule untroubled by popular dissatisfaction was clearly coming to an end. In late 1967, the King turned to Abd al-Hamii al-Bakkush to serve as his chief steward.


A young, energetic reformer, al-Bakkush was enthusiastically endorsed by university students, youthful technocrats both in and out of government and the emerging professional class. He immediately set out to revamp the administration and to curtail the special privileges of senior officialdom. Bakkush also proposed to update the curriculum of the na-

tional university and to revitalize its staff. With traditional notables, he proved brusque, and refused to extend them the courtesies and special considerations to which they felt accustomed. The Prime Minister also moved vigorously to redirect efforts to modernize Libya's armed forces, paradoxically in close collaboration with United States and British advisers. In international affairs, Bakkush adopted a more assertive stance and closely aligned Libya with Arab nationalist policies. For the first time in a decade, Libya appeared to have bestirred herself and promised to embark fully on the mainstream of modernization.

Ten months later, Bakkush offered his resignation. Innovation and experimentation were laid to rest by the King upon the promptings of his conservative advisers, many of whom saw in the young Bakkush's imaginative initiatives a basic challenge to the royal hegemony. Idris himself appeared discomfited by the Prime Minister's restlessness and policy departures. In particular, he was apparently troubled by Bakkush's insistence that he be permitted to change the composition of the Cabinet and select individuals more attuned to his policies and goals. In the end, the aging monarch could not bring himself to delegate authority for such modest changes—he preferred more subterranean procedures which, to the external observer at least, seemed capricious and divisive.

On September 1, 1969, one year after the resignation of Prime Minister Bakkush, elements of the Libyan armed forces toppled the Idrisid regime. Ironically, King Idris was abroad on vacation when armored units seized key government offices. Within three days the country was secured, with most ministers either imprisoned or placed under house arrest. Doubtful security services were completely neutralized. Surprisingly, little resistance to the overthrow of the monarchy materialized, even among the bellicose tribes of Cyrenaica. The population at large reacted with a combination of initial bewilderment and, in the cities, with jubilation.

While information concerning the organizers of the coup is fragmentary, the boldness



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Libya's Oil Fields and Pipeline

of their action and the cool efficiency with which it was effected indicate painstaking planning. Only a few hundred troops, at most, were involved in the operation, which was apparently organized by a handful of junior officers. Once their potential opposition had been cowed, a republic was declared and a Revolutionary Command Council was established. The precise membership of the Council has never been revealed, suggesting that the junior officers had little initial support from their staff level superiors. While one or two lieutenant colonels have since stepped forward, their recent actions indicate that they were not within the core group which unleashed the mechanized forces on the morning of September 1, 1969.

Since the event, various junior officers have given the reasons for their actions and have outlined certain Revolutionary Command Council goals. Their rationale fits the standard pattern of explanation: (1) opposition to corruption and profiteering within the previous regime; (2) dissatisfaction with the performance of the monarchical institution; (3) bitterness over the undue influence of the Shalhi family both within the army and in royal councils; and (4) unhappiness over Libya's conservative posture on international issues, particularly those relating to Libya's role in the Arab-Israeli dispute.

The collapse of the monarchy itself occurred in the most pedestrian fashion. Crown

Prince Hassan al-Ridha appeared on the radio in mid-morning during the day of the coup to renounce his powers as deputy to the King and to express support for the new military regime. In the process, he requested the people of Libya to support the Revolutionary Command Council and disassociated himself from any opposition to it. Meanwhile, the King, who had been in residence in Turkey, moved to Greece where he has since remained in involuntary exile with a small coterie of supporters.

THE AFTERMATH

After the initial flush of exhilaration following the coup, the military has been compelled to settle down to the demanding task of administering complex governmental machinery and grappling with onerous social and economic problems. The latter could not be swept away with the old regime.

During the initial transitional period when the coup leaders have been required to structure their relationships with the existing bureaucracy, a small Cabinet team has been created. A nine-man Cabinet was formed on September 8, 1969, consisting of the following appointees:

Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, Agriculture and Agrarian Reform, Mahmud Sulaiman al-Maghrabi
 Minister of Unity and Foreign Affairs, Salih Masud Buwaysir
 Minister of Petroleum, Labor and Social Affairs, Anis Ahmad Shtaiwi
 Minister of Interior, Lieutenant Colonel Musa Ahmad al-Hasi
 Minister of Economy and Industry, Ali Umaish
 Minister of Health, Public Works and Communications, Dr. Ahmad al-Usta Umar
 Minister of Education and National Guidance, Muhammad al-Shitwi¹
 Minister of Defense, Lieutenant Colonel Aadim Said al-Hawat
 Minister of Justice, Muhammad ali al-Qadi

Thus far, the new leadership has not developed any clear set of publicly stated goals and objectives. The regime, to the extent that it exhibits any salient characteristics,

¹ The new government announced al-Shitwi's resignation on September 23 and his replacement with Musafa 'Abdallah bin Amamir.

appears to be intensely nationalistic, socialist in orientation and inclined towards xenophobia. As defined by the President of the Revolutionary Command Council and Commander in Chief of the Libyan Armed Forces, Lieutenant Colonel Mu'Ammar al-Qadhafi, Libyan socialism "is the socialism of Islam." It "springs from the heritage of the Libyan people, from its beliefs and historically rooted origins. Socialism does not, as some think; mean distribution of poverty. Rather it means distribution of wealth."

Much more specific is the new regime's attitude towards past relations with the United States and Great Britain. Late in October, the Maghrabi government officially requested that the United States and Great Britain evacuate their military forces from Libya on an urgent basis and turn over existing installations to the Libyan authorities. The request apparently spelled the end of the 1953 Libyan-British Mutual Defense Agreement and the 1954 Libyan-United States Base Agreement several years in advance of their scheduled expiration date.

THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE

Military rule in Libya faces many uncertainties. The Revolutionary Council remains a faceless body which may or may not be homogeneous, and may or may not have long-term staying power. The Cabinet is comprised of individuals without experience in managing the affairs of government. Uncertainty exists concerning the loyalty of the inherited bureaucracy, as well as its capacity to develop the dynamism that Libya so desperately needs. The ability of the new leadership to rally the broad spectrum of Libyan groups to a comprehensive and rational program of action is yet to be demonstrated.

(Continued on page 50)

William H. Lewis has taught at George Washington University and writes frequently for professional journals. He is editor and co-author of *New Forces in Africa* (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1964) and *French-Speaking Africa: The Search for Identity* (New York: Walker & Co., 1965).

BOOK REVIEWS

POLITICAL AND SOCIAL THOUGHT IN THE CONTEMPORARY MIDDLE EAST. EDITED BY KEMAL H. KARPAT. (New York: Praeger, 1969. Foreword, 390 pages and index, \$10.00.)

This book is an anthology of over sixty articles translated into English and written by some of the most important political theoreticians and politicians. The book covers the Arab world, Turkey and Iran; only the brief fifteen page section on Iran is weak and inadequate. The section on the Arab world is far more up-to-date and comprehensive than comparable tomes such as the one edited by Sylvia Haim (*Arab Nationalism, An Anthology*, 1962). The large scope of political ideas expressed in the Arab world is amply apparent in the more than forty articles translated here. Equal stress is given to the nature of Arab nationalism and its competing, more parochial variants and to the various formulations of Arab socialism espoused by an increasing number of Arabs. The articles on Turkey are equally strong and well chosen: they reflect the depth of expertise the editor has in his field.

This very readable anthology will prove indispensable for students of the contemporary Arab world and Turkey. Its usefulness is heightened more by the brief biographies of all the authors contributing articles than by the inclusion of introductions to the various sections. However, this volume should not be considered a comprehensive introductory anthology to the most important social and political writings in the entire Middle East; the weak section on Iran and the fact that there is no reference to political and social trends in Israel limit the utility of the book. The author perhaps should have narrowed his scope to include only Turkey and the Arab world. But even then, a section de-

voted to Israeli political and social writings and a section devoted to Arab writings on the impact of Israel on political and social trends in the Arab world and on the nascent Palestinian movement might have been a useful addition.

Michael H. Van Dusen
Johns Hopkins University

IRAQ UNDER QASSEM: A POLITICAL HISTORY, 1958-1963. BY URIEL DANN. (New York, London, and Jerusalem: Frederick A. Praeger, Pall Mall Press, and Israel Universities Press, 1969. 405 pages, illustrations, maps, appendix, bibliography and index, \$10.00.)

Uriel Dann, an Israeli scholar originally from Germany, has written an ambitious and meticulously researched work that will be of interest primarily to the Middle East specialist. The book suffers from the author's not infrequent lack of objectivity, occasionally deadening prose style, and narrow political focus. Dann's characterization of Qassem is interesting, often revealing, and yet curiously incomplete in the light of the author's detailed treatment of other aspects of the Iraqi political process. Dann provides valuable data (particularly on Iraqi Communist activities) but little perspective on the Iraqi scene, and he gives few insights into the wider currents of revolutionary Arab politics.

Norman F. Howard
Department of Defense

YEMEN: THE UNKNOWN WAR. BY DANA ADAMS SCHMIDT. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968. 316 pages, introduction, index, 2 maps, 8 pages of photographs, \$6.50.)

This journalistic account of the conflict between Yemeni republicans and royalists by *The New York Times* Middle East

(Continued on page 52)

CURRENT DOCUMENTS

U.S. Supreme Court Ruling on School Desegregation, 1969

On October 29, 1969, the United States Supreme Court handed down a decision in the case of Alexander et al. v. Holmes County Board of Education. Heard on a petition from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, the Court overruled the Circuit Court's grant of a delay in filing desegregation plans for the school districts of Mississippi under Fifth Circuit jurisdiction. In a brief and sweeping judgment, the Supreme Court declared that "all deliberate speed" is no longer permissible; hereafter desegregation is to be immediate.

632—Beatrice Alexander et al., petrs., v. Holmes County Board of Education et al., on writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, per curiam. These cases come to the court on a petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The petition was granted on October 9, 1969, and the case set down for early argument.

The question presented is one of paramount importance, involving as it does the denial of fundamental rights to many thousands of schoolchildren who are presently attending Mississippi schools under segregated conditions contrary to the applicable decisions of this Court.

Against this background, the Court of Appeals should have denied all motions for additional time because continued operation of segregated schools under a standard of allowing "all deliberate speed" for desegregation is no longer constitutionally permissible. Under explicit holdings of this Court, the obligation of every school district is to terminate dual school systems at once and to operate now and hereafter only unitary schools. *Griffin v. School Board*, 377 U.S. 218, 234 (1964); *Green v. County School Board of New Kent County*, 391 U.S. 430, 438-439, 422 (1968).

Accordingly it is hereby adjudged, ordered and decreed:

1. The Court of Appeals' order of August 28, 1969, is vacated, and the cases are remanded to that court to issue its decree and order, effective immediately, declaring that each of the school districts here involved may no longer operate a dual school system based on race or color, and directing that they begin immediately to operate as unitary school systems within which no person is to be effectively excluded from any school because of race or color.

2. The Court of Appeals may in its discretion direct the schools here involved to accept all or any part of the August 11, 1969, recommendation of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, with any modifications which that court deems proper insofar as those recommendations insure a totally unitary school system for all eligible pupils without regard to race or color.

The Court of Appeals may make its determination and enter its order without further arguments or submissions.

3. While each of these school systems is being operated as a unitary system under the order of the Court of Appeals, the District Court may hear and consider objections thereto or proposed amendments thereof, pro-

vided, however, that the Court of Appeals' order shall be complied with in all respects while the District Court considers such objections or amendments, if any are made.

No amendment shall become effective before being passed upon by the Court of Appeals.

4. The Court of Appeals shall retain jurisdiction to insure prompt and faithful compliance with its order, and may modify or

amend the same as may be deemed necessary or desirable for the operation of a unitary school system.

5. The order of the Court of Appeals dated August 28, 1969, having been vacated and the case remanded for proceedings in conformity with this order, the judgment shall issue forthwith and the Court of Appeals is requested to give priority to the execution of this judgment as far as possible and necessary.

President Nixon's U.N. Statement on the Middle East, 1969

On September 18, 1969, President Richard Nixon addressed the 24th Session of the United Nations General Assembly. The portion of his speech which refers to United States policy in the Middle East is printed below:

• • •

In relations between the United States and the various Communist powers, I have said that we move from an era of confrontation to an era of negotiation.

I believe our relations with the Soviet Union can be conducted in a spirit of mutual respect, recognizing our differences and also our right to differ, recognizing our divergent interests and also our common interests, recognizing the interests of our respective allies as well as our own.

Now, it would be idle to pretend that there are not major problems between us, and conflicting interests. The tensions of the past 30 years have not been caused by mere personal misunderstandings. This is why we have indicated the need for extended negotiations on a broad front of issues.

Already, as you know, we have had extensive consultations with the Soviet Union as well as with others about the Middle East, where events of the past few days point up anew the urgency of a stable peace.

The United States continues to believe that the U.N. cease-fire resolutions define the

minimal conditions that must prevail on the ground if settlement is to be achieved in the Middle East. We believe the Security Council resolution of November, 1967, charts the way to that settlement.

A peace, to be lasting, must leave no seeds of a future war. It must rest on a settlement which both sides have a vested interest in maintaining.

We seek a settlement based on respect for the sovereign right of each nation in the area to exist within secure and recognized boundaries. We are convinced that peace cannot be achieved on the basis of substantial alterations in the map of the Middle East. And we are equally convinced that peace cannot be achieved on the basis of anything less than a binding, irrevocable commitment by the parties to live together in peace.

Failing a settlement, an agreement on the limitation of the shipment of arms to the Middle East might help to stabilize the situation. We have indicated to the Soviet Union, without result, our willingness to enter such discussions. • • •

President Nixon's Statement on Vietnam, 1969

Answering American critics of United States policy in Vietnam, President Richard Nixon broadcast a speech on November 3, 1969, setting forth his policy of Vietnamizing the war. The text follows:

Good evening, my fellow Americans. Tonight I want to talk to you on a subject of deep concern to all Americans and to many people in all parts of the world, the war in Vietnam.

I believe that one of the reasons for the deep division about Vietnam is that many Americans have lost confidence in what their Government has told them about our policy. The American people cannot and should not be asked to support a policy which involves the overriding issues of war and peace unless they know the truth about that policy.

Tonight, therefore, I would like to answer some of the questions that I know are on the minds of many of you listening to me.

How and why did America get involved in Vietnam in the first place?

How has this Administration changed the policy of the previous Administration?

What has really happened in the negotiations in Paris and the battlefield in Vietnam?

What choices do we have if we are to end the war?

What are the prospects for peace?

Now let me begin by describing the situation I found when I was inaugurated on Jan. 20th: The war had been going on for four years. Thirty-one thousand Americans had been killed in action. The training program for the South Vietnamese was behind schedule. Five hundred forty-thousand Americans were in Vietnam with no plans to reduce the number. No progress had been made at the negotiations in Paris and the United States

had not put forth a comprehensive peace proposal.

The war was causing deep division at home and criticism from many of our friends, as well as our enemies, abroad.

In view of these circumstances, there were some who urged that I end the war at once by ordering the immediate withdrawal of all American forces. From a political standpoint, this would have been a popular and easy course to follow. After all, we became involved in the war while my predecessor was in office.

I could blame the defeat, which would be the result of my action, on him—and come out as the peacemaker.

Some put it to me quite bluntly: this was the only way to avoid allowing Johnson's war to become Nixon's war.

But I had a greater obligation than to think only of the years of my Administration, and of the next election. I had to think of the effect of my decision on the next generation, and on the future of peace and freedom in America, and in the world.

Let us all understand that the question before us is not whether some Americans are for peace and some Americans are against peace. The question at issue is not whether Johnson's war becomes Nixon's war. The great question is: How can we win America's peace?

Well, let us turn now to the fundamental issue: why and how did the United States become involved in Vietnam in the first place?

Fifteen years ago North Vietnam, with the logistical support of Communist China and the Soviet Union, launched a campaign to impose a Communist government on South Vietnam by instigating and supporting a revolution.

In response to the request of the Government of South Vietnam, President Eisenhower sent economic aid and military equipment to assist the people of South Vietnam in their efforts to prevent a Communist takeover.

Seven years ago, President Kennedy sent 16,000 military personnel to Vietnam as combat advisers. Four years ago, President Johnson sent American combat forces to South Vietnam.

Now many believe that President Johnson's decision to send American combat forces to South Vietnam was wrong. And many others, I among them, have been strongly critical of the way the war has been conducted.

But the question facing us today is—now that we are in the war, what is the best way to end it?

In January I could only conclude that the precipitate withdrawal of all American forces from Vietnam would be a disaster not only for South Vietnam but for the United States and for the cause of peace.

For the South Vietnamese, our precipitate withdrawal would inevitably allow the Communists to repeat the massacres which followed their takeover in the North 15 years before. They then murdered more than 50,000 people and hundreds of thousands more died in slave labor camps.

We saw a prelude of what would happen in South Vietnam when the Communists entered the city of Hué last year. During their brief rule there, there was a bloody reign of terror in which 3,000 civilians were clubbed, shot to death, and buried in mass graves.

With the sudden collapse of our support, these atrocities at Hué would become the nightmare of the entire nation and particularly for the million-and-a-half Catholic refugees who fled to South Vietnam when the Communists took over in the North.

For the United States this first defeat in our nation's history would result in a collapse of confidence in American leadership not only in Asia but throughout the world.

Three American Presidents have recognized the great stakes involved in Vietnam and understood what had to be done.

In 1963 President Kennedy with his characteristic eloquence and clarity said we want to see a stable Government there, carrying on the struggle to maintain its national independence.

We believe strongly in that. We are not going to withdraw from that effort. In my opinion, for us to withdraw from that effort would mean a collapse not only of South Vietnam but Southeast Asia. So we're going to stay there.

President Eisenhower and President Johnson expressed the same conclusion during their terms of office. For the future of peace, precipitate withdrawal would be a disaster of immense magnitude.

A nation cannot remain great if it betrays its allies and lets down its friends. Our defeat and humiliation in South Vietnam without question would promote recklessness in the councils of those great powers who have not yet abandoned their goals of world conquest.

This would spark violence wherever our commitments help maintain the peace—in the Middle East, in Berlin, eventually even in the Western Hemisphere.

Ultimately, this would cost more lives. It would not bring peace. It would bring more war.

For these reasons I rejected the recommendation I should end the war by immediately withdrawing all of our forces. I chose instead to change American policy on both the negotiating front and the battle front in order to end the war on many fronts. I initiated a pursuit for peace on many fronts.

In a television speech on May 14, in a speech before the United Nations, on a number of other occasions, I set forth our peace proposals in great detail. We have offered the complete withdrawal of all outside forces within one year. We have pro-

posed a cease fire under international supervision. We have offered free elections under international supervision with the Communists participating in the organization and conduct of the elections as an organized political force.

And the Saigon Government has pledged to accept the result of the election.

We have not put forth our proposals on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. We have indicated that we're willing to discuss the proposals that have been put forth by the other side. We have declared that anything is negotiable, except the right of the people of South Vietnam to determine their own future.

At the Paris peace conference Ambassador Lodge has demonstrated our flexibility and good faith in 40 public meetings. Hanoi has refused even to discuss our proposals. They demand our unconditional acceptance of their terms which are that we withdraw all American forces immediately and unconditionally and that we overthrow the Government of South Vietnam as we leave.

We have not limited our peace initiatives to public forums and public statements. I recognized in January that a long and bitter war like this usually cannot be settled in a public forum.

That is why in addition to the public statements and negotiations, I have explored every possible private avenue that might lead to a settlement.

Tonight, I am taking the unprecedented step of disclosing to you some of our other initiatives for peace, initiatives we undertook privately and secretly because we thought we thereby might open a door which publicly would be closed.

I did not wait for my inauguration to begin my quest for peace. Soon after my election, through an individual who was directly in contact on a personal basis with the leaders of North Vietnam, I made two private offers for a rapid, comprehensive settlement.

Hanoi's replies called in effect for our surrender before negotiations. Since the Soviet Union furnishes most of the military equipment for North Vietnam, Secretary of State Rogers, my assistant for national security

affairs, Dr. Kissinger, Ambassador Lodge and I personally have met on a number of occasions with representatives of the Soviet Government to enlist their assistance in getting meaningful negotiations started.

In addition, we have had extended discussions directed toward that same end with representatives of other governments which have diplomatic relations with North Vietnam.

None of these initiatives have to date produced results. In mid-July I became convinced that it was necessary to make a major move to break the deadlock in the Paris talks.

I spoke directly in this office, where I'm now sitting, with an individual who had known Ho Chi Minh on a personal basis for 25 years. Through him I sent a letter to Ho Chi Minh.

I did this outside the usual diplomatic channels with the hope that with the necessity of making statements for propaganda removed, there might be constructive progress toward bringing the war to an end.

"Dear Mr. President:

"I realize that it is difficult to communicate meaningfully across the gulf of four years of war. But precisely because of this gulf I wanted to take this opportunity to reaffirm in all solemnity my desire to work for a just peace.

"I deeply believe that the war in Vietnam has gone on too long and delay in bringing it to an end can benefit no one, least of all the people of Vietnam. The time has come to move forward at the conference table toward an early resolution of this tragic war.

"You will find us forthcoming and open-minded in a common effort to bring the blessings of peace to the brave people of Vietnam.

"Let history record that at this critical juncture both sides turned their face towards peace rather than toward conflict and war."

I received Ho Chi Minh's reply on Aug. 30, three days before his death. It simply reiterated the public position North Vietnam had taken at Paris and flatly rejected my initiative. The full text of both letters is being released to the press.

In addition to the public meetings that I've referred to, Ambassador Lodge has met with Vietnam's chief negotiator in Paris in 11 private sessions.

And we have taken other significant initiatives which must remain secret to keep open some channels of communications which may still prove to be productive.

But the effect of all the public, private and secret negotiations which have been undertaken since the bombing halt a year ago, and since this Administration came into office on Jan. 20, can be summed up in one sentence: No progress whatever has been made except agreement on the shape of the bargaining table.

Well, now, who's at fault? It's becoming clear that the obstacle in negotiating an end to the war is not the President of the United States. It is not the South Vietnamese Government. The obstacle is the other side's absolute refusal to show the least willingness to join us in seeking a just peace.

And it will not do so while it is convinced that all it has to do is to wait for our next concession, and our next concession after that one, until it gets everything it wants.

There can now be no longer any question that progress in negotiation depends only on Hanoi's deciding to negotiate—to negotiate seriously.

I realize that this report on our efforts on the diplomatic front is discouraging to the American people, but the American people are entitled to know the truth—the bad news as well as the good news—where the lives of our young men are involved.

Now let me turn, however, to a more encouraging report on another front. At the time we launched our search for peace, I recognized we might not succeed in bringing an end to the war through negotiation. I therefore put into effect another plan to bring peace—a plan which will bring the war to an end regardless of what happens on the negotiating front.

It is in line with the major shift in U.S. foreign policy which I described in my press conference at Guam on July 25.

Let me briefly explain what has been de-

scribed as the Nixon Doctrine—a policy which not only will help end the war in Vietnam but which is an essential element of our program to prevent future Vietnams.

We Americans are a do-it-yourself people—we're an impatient people. Instead of teaching someone else to do a job, we like to do it ourselves. And this trait has been carried over into our foreign policy.

In Korea, and again in Vietnam, the United States furnished most of the money, most of the armament and most of the men to help the people of those countries defend their freedom against Communist aggression.

Before any American troops were committed to Vietnam, a leader of another Asian country expressed this opinion to me when I was traveling in Asia as a private citizen.

He said: "When you are trying to assist another nation defend its freedom, United States policy should be to help them fight the war, but not to fight the war for them."

Well, in accordance with this wise counsel, I laid down in Guam three principles of guidelines for future American policy toward Asia.

First, the United States will keep all of its treaty commitments.

Second, we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us, or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security.

Third, in cases involving other types of aggression we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.

After I announced this policy, I found that the leaders of the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, South Korea and other nations which might be threatened by Communist aggression, welcomed this new direction in American foreign policy.

The defense of freedom is everybody's business—not just America's business. And it is particularly the responsibility of the people whose freedom is threatened. In the previous Administration, we Americanized the

war in Vietnam. In this Administration, we are Vietnamizing the search for peace.

The policy of the previous Administration not only resulted in our assuming the primary responsibility for fighting the war, but even more significant did not adequately stress the goal of strengthening the South Vietnamese so that they could defend themselves when we left.

The Vietnamization plan was launched following Secretary Laird's visit to Vietnam in March. Under the plan, I ordered first a substantial increase in the training and equipment of South Vietnamese forces.

In July, on my visit to Vietnam, I changed General Abrams' orders so that they were consistent with the objectives of our new policies.

Under the new orders, the primary mission of our troops is to enable the South Vietnamese forces to assume the full responsibility for the security of South Vietnam. Our air operations have been reduced by over 20 per cent.

And now we have begun to see the results of this long-overdue change in American policy in Vietnam.

After five years of Americans going into Vietnam we are finally bringing American men home. By Dec. 15 over 60,000 men will have been withdrawn from South Vietnam, including 20 per cent of all of our combat forces.

The South Vietnamese have continued to gain in strength. As a result, they have been able to take over combat responsibilities from our American troops.

Two other significant developments have occurred since this Administration took office. Enemy infiltration, infiltration which is essential if they are to launch a major attack over the last three months, is less than 20 per cent of what it was over the same period last year.

And, most important, United States casualties have declined during the last two months to the lowest point in three years.

Let me now turn to our program for the future. We have adopted a plan which we have worked out in cooperation with the South Vietnamese for the complete with-

drawal of all United States combat ground forces and their replacement by South Vietnamese forces on an orderly scheduled timetable.

This withdrawal will be made from strength and not from weakness. As South Vietnamese forces become stronger, the rate of American withdrawal can become greater.

I have not, and do not, intend to announce the timetable for our program, and there are obvious reasons for this decision which I'm sure you will understand. As I've indicated on several occasions, the rate of withdrawal will depend on developments on three fronts. One of these is the progress which can be, or might be, made in the Paris talks.

An announcement of a fixed timetable for our withdrawal would completely remove any incentive for the enemy to negotiate an agreement. They would simply wait until our forces had withdrawn and then move in.

The other two factors on which we will base our withdrawal decisions are the level of enemy activity and the progress of the training programs of the South Vietnamese forces.

And I'm glad to be able to report tonight progress on both of these fronts has been greater than we anticipated when we started the program in June for withdrawal.

As a result, our timetable for withdrawal is more optimistic now than when we made our first estimates in June.

Now this clearly demonstrates why it is not wise to be frozen in on a fixed timetable. We must retain the flexibility to base each withdrawal decision on the situation as it is at that time, rather than on estimates that are no longer valid.

Along with this optimistic estimate, I must in all candor leave one note of caution. If the level of enemy activity significantly increases, we might have to adjust our timetable accordingly. However, I want the record to be completely clear on one point.

At the time of the bombing halt just a year ago there was some confusion as to whether there was an understanding on the part of the enemy that if we stopped the

(Continued on page 50)

ISRAEL: A GARRISON STATE

(Continued from page 6)

purchases and a heavy investment in a domestic arms industry have seriously depleted these reserves. President Nixon was very cautious with the Israeli Prime Minister, however, and it seems likely that Mrs. Meir returned to Israel with her "shopping list" largely unfilled. This does not mean that the United States has moved from its traditional position of support for Israel. Rather it probably means simply that the level of official United States support has declined and will likely remain diminished until Israel moves from her intransigent position.

THE ECONOMY

If, as seems reasonably clear, Israel is prepared, to an extent never before matched in her history, to "go it alone" militarily and diplomatically, then the last question to be asked is simply one of economics. Can her notoriously fragile and heavily dependent economy stand the strain, particularly if a long-range strain extends over several years? The answer given by Israeli economists and planners is a cautious and highly qualified "yes." There are several positive signs that have emerged since the military victory of 1967. The absorption of a very large Arab population within Israel's new boundaries has effectively held the country's persistent wage inflation in check and has led to a truly remarkable 12 per cent rise in real gross national product in fiscal 1968-1969, as well as to a very impressive 20 per cent rise in manufactured exports. In addition, there has been a sensational 100 per cent rise in net tourist earnings in 1969 as compared with 1967. (The biggest single group of tourists are American Jews.)

The greatest problem recognized in the forecasts prepared by Israel's Economic Planning Authority is that of balance of foreign payments. Over the years, Israel has persistently run a heavy imports surplus which was financed annually by a surplus in capital

accounts. Thus over the 18-year-period from 1950 to 1968, Israel received approximately \$9.3 billion from abroad and paid out \$1.9 billion. Of this net inflow, two-thirds consisted of unilateral transfers from governments or private groups abroad.

This massive capital inflow is expected by Israeli experts to start falling off from the 1967 peak of \$739 million to about \$500 million by 1971. By 1971, it is calculated that Israel's exports should be financing 79 per cent of her imports, compared with 64 per cent in 1967 and 13 per cent in 1950. Since imports themselves are expected to grow by 50 per cent by 1971, this means that Israel will have to achieve virtually a doubling of her export earnings, from \$865 million in 1967 to a projected \$1,525 million in 1971. Whether Israel, or any country for that matter, can achieve such a goal in such a limited time span and in the face of such handicaps as Israel faces, is highly debatable. Whether the economy proves to be the Achilles heel of Israel will probably be made clear fairly soon. If her economy should falter seriously, the consequences for her military, strategic and diplomatic policies would be marked. Obviously, therefore, the country's economy will remain under close scrutiny.

With all sides speaking in dogmatic tones, there is little prospect of a diplomatically negotiated settlement of the Palestine Question, which has been a problem for the world since World War II. There is, instead, a markedly increased chance of a renewed outbreak of major hostilities.

INSTABILITY IN SYRIA

(Continued from page 15)

relations. Moscow has been careful not to offend Syrian sensibilities with regard to the other Arab countries, yet it may regard Syria as a promising field for future advances.

THE ECONOMY

Under the Ba'athist regime, all large industry is nationalized, as are the banks and

foreign trade. An extensive land reform program has been carried out by successive governments over the past ten years. This program has redistributed about half the total cultivated land in the country. Agriculture employs over 60 per cent of the country's labor force; about 10 per cent is employed in manufacturing, mostly textiles.

Cotton is the main export crop, accounting for over 40 per cent of Syria's exports; wheat is the next most important export. An aspect of Syria's foreign exchange earnings often not remembered is the country's oil production. Syria's oil exports began in 1968 and they will become increasingly important in the future; transit fees for the two pipelines running through the country from Iraq and Saudi Arabia are important foreign exchange earners.

The Ba'athist regime has put great effort into developing a socialist economy, but the party has not followed a consistent policy. Inconsistency results from disagreement between the party's factions, largely over the speed and extent of socialization. In addition, with the growing socialization of the country and the consequent increasing discrimination against the entrepreneurial class, there has been a large emigration of management and skilled persons, numbering in the tens of thousands.

While the jockeying for position within the regime will continue, and the enmity between the Damascus and Baghdad regimes may increase, basic Syrian policies are unlikely to change during the foreseeable future. Syria's hard stance toward Israel will continue, and will perhaps harden, as the prospects for a settlement between the Israelis and Arabs diminish. This, in turn, could lead to an increase of infighting among the various Arab regimes, with the Syrians proclaiming the righteousness of their tough policy toward Israel and the United States. Failure to reach a settlement will increase the influence of the fedayeen and weaken the moderate Arab regimes, especially in Lebanon and Jordan. The Syrians might then be expected to try to radicalize the regimes of these two countries.

THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

(Continued from page 12)

formal settlement. Both the four-power talks (France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the U.S.S.R.) and the two-power talks (the United States and the U.S.S.R.), appeared to have produced no tangible results.

On the one hand, Israel showed every indication of her intent to remain in the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip, to say nothing of Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, which were considered "non-negotiable," and the Jordan Valley, and there was little indication of "justice for the refugees." On the other hand, the United Arab Republic, like the other Arab states immediately involved, insisted that Israel give up all the territory she had occupied in 1967 and insisted on a settlement of the refugee problem. Nasser declared on February 1, 1969, that if Israel agreed to leave the occupied territories, in accordance with the United Nations resolution of November 22, 1967, this step "could have been of tremendous effect in promoting a peaceful settlement." In return for such action, he said, the Arab states would offer 1) a declaration of non-belligerence; 2) the recognition of the right of each country to live in peace; 3) the territorial integrity of all countries in the Middle East, in recognized and secure borders; 4) freedom of navigation in international waterways; and 5) a just solution to the Palestinian refugee problem. At the same time, Nasser indicated his belief that the U.S.S.R. wanted a peaceful settlement of the conflict, and observed that the U.A.R. did "not want to go on mobilizing everything for war."

In a response to Ambassador Jarring in April, 1969, the U.A.R. called for Israeli implementation of the November, 1967, resolution, especially as to her withdrawal from occupied territories, as a preliminary to a more "peaceful settlement," under documents to be addressed to the United Nations Security Council, not directly to the parties con-

cerned. This was obviously not enough for the government of Israel. By mid-1969, the conflict had accelerated and on September 8, Israel staged her greatest raid since 1967 on U.A.R. territory in retaliation, it was said, against continuing Egyptian violations of the cease-fire lines. In the fall of 1969, there was little evidence in the United Arab Republic or at the General Assembly that the raids had produced the desired effect.

SHADOW ON LEBANON

(Continued from page 26)

the country. Meanwhile, the commando issue is symptomatic of a more serious problem: the contest between those favoring a more Arab-oriented Lebanon and those who subscribe to the maintenance of traditional Lebanese "neutralism."

JORDAN: THE COMMANDO STATE

(Continued from page 20)

Return of the territory to Jordan, with border adjustments and security guarantees for both Israel and Jordan, is probably the most satisfactory solution, but it remains a distant hope.

Israel's policy of curfew, expropriation of Arab land in the Jerusalem area, deportation of prominent political leaders from Jerusalem and the West Bank,¹⁸ demolition of the houses of suspected guerrillas, and other restrictions levied upon West Bank residents will hardly endear Israeli rule to the Jordanians.¹⁹ The comparative "mildness" of these policies, however comforting to Western notions of Israel's essential benevolence, will have little effect on Jordanian attitudes; continued occupa-

tion will very likely stimulate increased resistance, sabotage, terrorism and actual warfare. Arab outrage at the burning of the al-Aksa Mosque in August, 1969, is a foretaste of the problems to come. Whatever the outcome of this dangerous situation, there is little question that Jordan's political and economic progress has been slowed for many years.

ADEN AND SOUTH ARABIA

(Continued from page 33)

the word) was also a strong force in the area. Although both FLOSY and the N.L.F. received material and moral support from the U.A.R., it can be argued that the N.L.F. benefitted from Nasser's open and more enthusiastic support for FLOSY. Qahtan al-Shaabi could claim, in effect, that his party was more truly "nationalist."

A similar argument could be made with respect to the Yemen question. Members of FLOSY's top leadership not living in exile in Cairo could probably be found in Sana or Taiz. Again, it must have given elements in South Arabia pause to have FLOSY continually described as "Egyptian-backed and Taiz-based." While at all times basing itself in Aden and South Arabia, the N.L.F. regarded the question of merging with Yemen with caution. The front did decide to include the word "Yemen" in the name of the new polity (Southern Yemen), but any question of merger appears to have been deferred to the distant future. Also, FLOSY undoubtedly placed too much emphasis on contacts with the United Nations. While the FLOSY leaders conferred with the U.N., the N.L.F. was establishing itself in a majority of the federated states and the three states of the Eastern Protectorate.

On the other hand, the ruthlessness of the methods employed by the N.L.F. must not be overlooked. To render its opponents leaderless, the National Liberation Front did not hesitate to employ the tool of political assassination. Over one-half—by some reports as

¹⁸ Nadim Zaro, Mayor of Ramallah, a West Bank town, was the latest of a series of prominent personages to be deported. *The Washington Post*, October 7, 1969, p. A10.

¹⁹ For a critical Israeli view of this policy, see Amnon Kapeliuk, "Unrest in the West Bank," *New Outlook*, vol. 11, November-December, 1968, pp. 4-6.

high as three-fourths—of FLOSY's leaders that decided to remain in Aden were exterminated. (FLOSY also employed assassins against its rival, but was much less successful.)

Despite FLOSY's defeat, Nasser's policies were by no means totally unsuccessful. First, by also aiding the N.L.F., he took out a kind of "political insurance." The sultans met defeat, and Nasser could take pleasure in seeing more Arab "reactionaries" crushed by revolutionaries. He could claim that his aid to the N.L.F. helped to bring this about. Second, with the British colonialists out of the way, Egyptian tankers could make use of the refinery at Little Aden to process crude oil. This was important, as Egypt's main refinery was demolished by the Israelis in the 1967 war. Finally, when it became obvious that the N.L.F. would take over, the surviving FLOSY leadership hurriedly left for exile in Cairo. Thus, should things go badly in the future for the N.L.F., Nasser has a handy tool in these exiled FLOSY leaders for the revival of subversive activities.

LIBYA: THE END OF MONARCHY

(Continued from page 38)

(Indeed, the regime's attitude concerning popular participation in public affairs awaits clarification.) Finally, the ability of the regime to protect the national interest in the emotion-laden, explosive atmosphere of the Middle East is yet to be tested.

The military has not produced a charismatic hero nor any viable system around which the Libyan people can rally. If the army does not create a system capable of meeting the problems of a changing society in the 1970's, the events of September 1, 1969, will have been tragic indeed. For, whatever its defects, the Idrisid system managed to tie the country together during the difficult post-independence transition period. At present, the prospects are far from bright that the military will be able to carry Libya through

the even more difficult post-oil transition period.

CURRENT DOCUMENTS

(Continued from page 46)

bombing of North Vietnam, they would stop the shelling of cities in South Vietnam.

I want to be sure that there is no misunderstanding on the part of the enemy with regard to our withdrawal program. We have noted the reduced level of infiltration, the reduction of our casualties and are basing our withdrawal decisions partially on those factors.

If the level of infiltration or our casualties increase while we are trying to scale down the fighting, it will be the result of a conscious decision by the enemy. Hanoi could make no greater mistake than to assume that an increase in violence will be to its advantage.

If I conclude that increased enemy action jeopardizes our remaining forces in Vietnam, I shall not hesitate to take strong and effective measures to deal with that situation.

This is not a threat. This is a statement of policy which as commander in chief of our armed forces I am making in meeting my responsibility for the protection of American fighting men wherever they may be.

My fellow Americans, I am sure you can recognize from what I have said that we really have only two choices open to us if we want to end this war.

I can order an immediate precipitate withdrawal of all Americans from Vietnam without regard to the effects of that action.

Or we can persist in our search for a just peace through a negotiated settlement, if possible, or through continued implementation of our plan for Vietnamization, if necessary; a plan in which we will withdraw all of our forces from Vietnam on a schedule in accordance with our program as the South Vietnamese become strong enough to defend their own freedom.

I have chosen this second course. It is not the easy way. It is the right way. It is a plan which will end the war and serve the

cause of peace, not just in Vietnam but in the Pacific and the world.

In speaking of the consequences of a precipitous withdrawal, I mentioned that our allies would lose confidence in America. Far more dangerous, we would lose confidence in ourselves. Oh, the immediate reaction would be a sense of relief that our men were coming home. But as we saw the consequences of what we had done, inevitable remorse and divisive recrimination would scar our spirit as a people.

We have faced other crises in our history and we have become stronger by rejecting the easy way out and taking the right way in meeting our challenges. Our greatness as a nation has been our capacity to do what has to be done when we knew our course was right.

I recognize that some of my fellow Americans have reached different conclusions as to how peace should be achieved. Honest and patriotic citizens disagree with the plan I have chosen.

In San Francisco a few weeks ago, I saw demonstrators carrying signs reading, "Lost in Vietnam, bring the boys home."

Well, one of the strengths of our free society is that any American has a right to reach that conclusion and to advocate that point of view.

But as President of the United States, I would be untrue to my oath of office to be dictated to by the minority who hold that point of view and who try to impose it on the nation by mounting demonstrations in the street.

For almost 200 years, the policy of this nation has been made under our Constitution by those leaders in the Congress and the White House elected by all the people.

If a vocal minority, however fervent its cause, prevails over reason and the will of the majority, this nation has no future as a free society.

And now I would like to address a word, if I may, to the young people of this nation who are particularly concerned, and I understand why they are concerned about this war.

I respect your idealism. I share your con-

cern for peace. I want peace as much as you do. There are powerful personal reasons I want to end this war. This week I will have to sign 83 letters to mothers, fathers, wives and loved ones of men who have given their lives for America in Vietnam.

It is very little satisfaction to me that this is only one-third as many letters as I signed the first week in office. There is nothing I want more than to see the day come when I do not have to write any of those letters.

I want to end the war to save the lives of those brave young men in Vietnam. I want to end it in a way which will increase the chance that their younger brothers and their sons will not have to fight in some future Vietnam some place in the world.

And I want to end the war for another reason. I want to end it so that the energy and dedication of you, our young people, now too often directed into bitter hatred against those responsible for the war, can be turned to the great challenges of peace, a better life for all Americans, a better life for all people on this earth.

I have chosen a plan for peace. I believe it will succeed. If it does not succeed, what the critics say now won't matter. Or if it does succeed, what the critics say now won't matter. If it does not succeed, anything I say then won't matter.

I know it may not be fashionable to speak of patriotism or national destiny these days, but I feel it is appropriate to do so on this occasion.

Two hundred years ago this nation was weak and poor. But even then, America was the hope of millions in the world.

Today we have become the strongest and richest nation in the world, and the wheel of destiny has turned so that any hope the world has for the survival of peace and freedom will be determined by whether the American people have the moral stamina and the courage to meet the challenge of free-world leadership.

Let historians not record that, when America was the most powerful nation in the world, we passed on the other side of the road and allowed the last hopes for peace

and freedom of millions of people to be suffocated by the forces of totalitarianism.

So tonight, to you, the great silent majority of my fellow Americans, I ask for your support. I pledged in my campaign for the Presidency to end the war in a way that we could win the peace.

I have initiated a plan of action which will enable me to keep that pledge. The more support I can have from the American people, the sooner that pledge can be redeemed. For the more divided we are at home, the less likely the enemy is to negotiate in Paris.

Let us be united for peace. Let us also be united against defeat. Because let us understand—North Vietnam cannot defeat or humiliate the United States. Only Americans can do that.

Fifty years ago, in this room, and at this very desk, President Woodrow Wilson spoke words which caught the imagination of a war-weary world. He said: "This is the war to end wars." His dream for peace after World War I was shattered on the hard reality of great power politics. And Woodrow Wilson died a broken man.

Tonight, I do not tell you that the war in Vietnam is the war to end wars, but I do say this:

I have initiated a plan which will end this war in a way that will bring us closer to that great goal to which Woodrow Wilson and every American President in our history has been dedicated—the goal of a just and lasting peace.

As President I hold the responsibility for choosing the best path for that goal and then leading the nation along it.

I pledge to you tonight that I shall meet this responsibility with all of the strength and wisdom I can command, in accordance with your hopes, mindful of your concerns, sustained by your prayers.

BOOK REVIEWS

(Continued from page 39)

correspondent combines history, travelogue and current events. Schmidt emphasizes the war itself rather than the socio-political

forces which sustain it, and his pro-royalist bias leads him to neglect the republican side. This is hardly a definitive work, but it does provide some interesting observations.

N.F.H.

DE GAULLE, ISRAEL AND THE JEWS.

By RAYMOND ARON. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969. 157 pages and index, \$5.95.)

In this short book, Aron outlines the thoughts and emotions of non-religious French Jews regarding the anti-Israeli stand of President Charles de Gaulle in the period of the June, 1967, Arab-Israeli war. He summarizes these feelings well: "... France had renounced her neutrality and had taken sides: the Israelis were guilty of the crime of *lese-gaullism*, they preferred the safety of their towns to the tokens of compassion and esteem which General de Gaulle had promised them, at his next press conference, as repayment for their docility. . . . Deceitfulness in the service of some great undertaking is easily forgiven . . . but not when the objective smells of petrol and when the turnabout seems to have been dictated by bad temper, wounded pride or some obscure piece of calculation."

The book contains an interesting analysis of the concern shared by most European Jews with regard to the resilience of anti-Semitism. Poor proofreading mars an otherwise well produced book.

O.E.S.

MIDDLE EAST PAST AND PRESENT.

By YAHYA ARMJANI. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970. 403 pages, bibliography, chronology and index, \$8.95.)

Armajani's history of the Middle East is comprehensive, scholarly and even-handed. An Iranian by birth and Western in education, the author brings 25 years of teaching in the field of Middle Eastern history to his work. The result is an excellent overview which will be of help and interest to all students at the college level.

O.E.S.

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A CURRENT HISTORY chronology covering the most important events of November, 1969, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

Central America

Nov. 10—After two days of informal talks, the foreign ministers of Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras and Costa Rica agree to try to save the area's Common Market. This is the first meeting of the group since the war between El Salvador and Honduras in July.

Disarmament

Nov. 15—Gerard C. Smith, chief negotiator for the U.S., and Vladimir S. Semyonov, chief negotiator for the U.S.S.R., arrive in Helsinki, Finland, for the talks on limiting strategic arms (SALT).

Nov. 17—The preliminary SALT talks between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. open in Helsinki.

Nov. 24—The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet ratifies the treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Soviet President Nikolai V. Podgorny signs the document in Moscow. U.S. President Richard Nixon signs the treaty at the same time in Washington. 19 more nations must ratify the treaty before it becomes effective.

European Economic Community (Common Market)

Nov. 10—The 6 member nations of the Common Market decide to negotiate a trade treaty with Japan. This will be the first treaty between the 6 and Japan; Japan trades extensively with European nations.

Nov. 22—It is reported from Brussels that Great Britain has entered into an agreement with the European Economic Community for the joint development of advanced industries; it is hoped by some observers that the agreement will pave the

way for Britain's entry into the Common Market.

European Free Trade Association (E.F.T.A.)

Nov. 7—At the close of a 2-day session, members of the European Free Trade Association reaffirm their belief in liberal trading policies. Any ties with the Common Market should avoid the restoration of tariff barriers. The members of E.F.T.A., Britain, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Austria, Switzerland, Portugal and Finland (an associate member), have virtually eliminated all tariffs on industrial goods in their trade with one another.

Middle East Crisis

(See also *Greece*)

Nov. 4—Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban, commenting on the recent accord reached between Lebanese authorities and Arab guerrillas, says that Lebanon remains responsible for peace on the Israeli border.

Nov. 6—Speaking to the National Assembly, President Gamal Abdel Nasser of the U.A.R. says that "fire and blood," not politics, is the way for the Arabs to recover the land occupied by Israel; he contends that the Soviet Union is the friend of the Arabs; the U.S. is the enemy.

Nov. 8—At a meeting of the Arab League's Joint Defense Council, United Arab Republic's Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad rejects the latest United States peace plan for the Middle East.

Nov. 9—A Cairo communiqué says that the Egyptian Navy shelled an Israeli command center and installations in the Sinai Peninsula for more than an hour; Egyptian sources say that the command post, ammunition dumps and fuel depots have

been destroyed. This is denied by Israeli sources.

Nov. 10—At the end of 3 days of discussions by the delegations to the Arab League's Joint Defense Council, it is announced that 13 Arab countries have agreed to a summit meeting to be held in Rabat, Morocco, on December 20. The announcement also condemns the U.S. for its assistance to Israel.

An Israeli military spokesman says that Egyptian ground-to-air missile sites along the Suez Canal have been virtually wiped out during the last several months by Israeli air attacks.

Nov. 11—Israeli jets down 3 Egyptian MIG-21 fighters. This is the first time that Egyptian fighters have been sent aloft to intercept Israeli planes bombarding the area along the Suez Canal.

Nov. 12—According to officials of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, 14 of the 15 United Nations refugee camps in Lebanon have been taken over by Palestinian commandos in the 21 days since the fighting broke out between the guerrillas and Lebanon.

Nov. 16—Two Israeli ships are damaged by explosives in the harbor of Elath. The sabotage is believed to be the work of Arab frogmen. The incident violates a tacit agreement to keep Elath and the port of Aqaba free of the Israeli-Jordanian conflict.

Nov. 17—Three areas of Jordan are attacked by Israeli jets. Israeli officials say that the attacks are centered on artillery positions manned by Jordanian, Iraqi and Syrian units.

Nov. 20—The arrest of more than 50 suspected Arab terrorists is announced by Israeli police and security officials.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

Nov. 5—At a meeting of the North Atlantic Council, the U.S. declares that the Soviet Union and other Communist bloc nations must demonstrate a clear interest in a balanced reduction of force if they are sincere

in seeking an East-West agreement. The U.S. is temporarily successful in convincing NATO members to give a negative answer to the Warsaw Pact proposal for an all-European security conference in the early part of 1970.

Nov. 12—The 7-member Nuclear Planning Group of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, consisting of the U.S., Great Britain, West Germany, Italy, Turkey, Belgium and Denmark, meeting in Virginia, agree to place greater reliance on nuclear weapons to deter Soviet aggression. If the plans are approved by allied defense ministers meeting in Brussels in December, 1969, guidelines will be provided for consultation before nuclear weapons are used and for the specific use of tactical weapons.

Space Exploration

Nov. 15—Three U.S. astronauts in the spacecraft Apollo 12 are launched toward the moon.

Nov. 19—Two of the U.S. astronauts from Apollo 12 land on target on the moon for scientific exploration.

Nov. 24—The three astronauts land in the Pacific Ocean after their successful 10-day trip.

United Nations

Nov. 1—A U.S. report on behalf of the United Nations Command in Korea indicates that there has been a sharp drop in the number of incidents along the border between North and South Korea in 1969.

The World Food Program, a joint effort of the United Nations and the Food and Agriculture Organization, announces the allocation of \$56 million for a dairy program in India.

Nov. 11—A proposal to expel Nationalist China and seat the government of Communist China is defeated for the 20th consecutive year by the General Assembly. The vote is 48 for, 56 against, with 21 abstentions.

Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau of Canada discusses Canadian plans to as-

sume responsibility for antipollution measures for the North American Arctic with Secretary General U Thant. Canada claims sovereignty of the Arctic Islands but has taken no firm position about the waters surrounding them; the U.S. regards these waters as an international waterway. The September, 1969, voyage of the tanker *Manhattan* through the Northwest Passage makes the question of Arctic rights more imminent.

Nov. 17—The Political Committee of the General Assembly votes 71 to 29 in favor of keeping 55,000 U.S. troops in South Korea for another year under the United Nations flag.

The head of the United Nations Palestine aid agency acknowledges that Arab commandos occupy 14 of the 15 refugee camps in Lebanon but insists that relief supplies for the refugees are not being diverted to the Arab guerrillas.

The U.S. and the Soviet Union plead with members of the U.N. to endorse their draft treaty barring nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction from the ocean floors. Smaller nations have criticized Soviet-U.S. disarmament policies.

Nov. 19—The General Assembly votes 84 to 0, with 30 abstentions, for an Indonesian take-over of former Dutch West New Guinea, known as West Irian.

The Netherlands and 27 other countries request the General Assembly's Legal Committee to approve a proposal to combat airplane piracy and to insure the prosecution of hijackers.

Nov. 20—The General Assembly, by a vote of 113 to 2 with 2 abstentions, endorses a manifesto demanding an end to racism in South Africa.

The Social Committee of the General Assembly passes a resolution, by a 51 to 11 vote with 50 abstentions, condemning Israel's policies of "collective punishment" in reprisal for Arab terrorist attacks. The vote condemns the destruction of homes and the deportation of Arab inhabitants of Israeli-occupied territories. The U.S. is among those abstaining.

Nov. 21—African states score a victory in the General Assembly when resolutions are passed which attack racial practices in Rhodesia and South Africa; however, the effectiveness of the resolutions is weakened because of the opposition of the U.S. and Britain and the number of nations abstaining.

War in Vietnam

Nov. 1—U.S. infantrymen report that in the last two weeks they have uncovered six enemy arsenals and destroyed the headquarters of a Vietcong regiment on a major infiltration route about 40 miles north of Saigon.

Nov. 4—Enemy troops attack U.S. positions near Dau Tieng, Tayninh city and Songbe near the Cambodian border; at least 3 Americans are killed and 43 wounded. Enemy forces also stage attacks on 21 allied bases and towns throughout the country.

Nov. 5—In their biggest fight in 4 months, South Vietnamese forces clash with 2 North Vietnamese units, the South Vietnamese are supported by U.S. planes and artillery.

Nov. 6—South Vietnamese Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky says that the aim of the South Vietnamese is to take over at a pace that will permit the withdrawal of all U.S. combat troops by the end of 1970 and of U.S. support troops a year later.

U.S. military officials announce that they have decided not to commit any U.S. ground forces to the fighting along the Cambodian border; their aim is to test the strength of South Vietnamese forces.

U.S. commanders in Vietnam contend that it will be feasible to withdraw all U.S. ground combat troops from Vietnam within 18 months.

Nov. 7—Government outposts on the outskirts of Saigon are reinforced in the wake of enemy ground attacks on the capital.

Vietcong agents fail in an attempt to assassinate a South Vietnamese Cabinet member.

Nov. 11—North Vietnamese troops attack a U.S. artillery base near the Cambodian border after a day-long battle with South Vietnamese mercenaries about a mile away.

Nov. 13—In the heaviest fighting reported in the area in over a year, North Vietnamese forces attack a U.S. company near the demilitarized zone.

Nov. 14—New fighting breaks out in the south Central Highlands near the Buprang Special Forces camp as North Vietnamese troops assault a South Vietnamese government battalion. Both North and South Vietnamese troops are struck by South Vietnamese fighter-bombers supporting the government forces.

The South Vietnam government reports that 92 per cent—16,020,300—of the South Vietnamese are now under government control; the Vietcong are said to retain control of 3.2 per cent.

In Paris, Mrs. Nguyen Thi Binh, Foreign Minister of the Provisional Revolutionary Government (Vietcong), says that if General Duong Van Minh, a leader of the non-Communist opposition to the present Saigon government, becomes head of a "peace" Cabinet, the Vietcong would "begin conversations with him."

Nov. 16—In the presence of U.S. officers, a group of South Vietnamese villagers reports that a U.S. infantry unit killed 567 unarmed men, women and children on March 16, 1968, in Songmy (Mylai 4). The villagers claim to be survivors of the massacre. The Army refuses to comment pending the outcome of an investigation; two men, a lieutenant and a sergeant were charged on November 14, 1969, in connection with the incident.

Nov. 17—U.S. jets attack North Vietnamese gun placements in Cambodia following the shelling of the U.S. Special Forces camp near Buprang. The U.S. command in Saigon, acknowledging the air strikes, says "this is an inherent right of self-defense against enemy attacks."

Hanoi radio announces that Christmas parcels may be sent to U.S. prisoners of war in North Vietnam.

Nov. 19—In a joint statement, U.S. Embassy officials and the U.S. military command disclaim approval of such atrocities as the alleged March, 1968, massacre of villagers by U.S. forces.

Nov. 20—Henry Cabot Lodge, chief U.S. delegate to the Paris peace talks, and his chief deputy resign effective December 8. President Nixon has not yet named their successors. White House sources deny that the resignations represent a downgrading of the talks.

Nov. 21—Robert E. Jordan 3d, the General Counsel of the U.S. Army, says at a Pentagon press conference that about 9 servicemen and about 15 former servicemen are being investigated in connection with the alleged massacre of South Vietnamese civilians in March, 1968.

U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard, at the conclusion of a 6-day assessment of the situation in South Vietnam, says that he is confident that the withdrawal of U.S. troops can continue.

Nov. 22—Xuan Thuy, North Vietnam's delegate to the Paris peace talks, says that Hanoi is and has been ready to meet the U.S. in private talks aimed at ending the war. He also says that President Nixon misinterpreted the letter sent to him by Ho Chi Minh shortly before Ho's death. In his November 3 speech, President Nixon referred to the letter as a "complete rejection" of his overtures for peace.

Mrs. Nguyen Thi Binh, representative of the Provisional Revolutionary Government (Vietcong) at the Paris peace talks, reiterates the refusal of the Vietcong to meet with representatives of the Saigon government.

Nov. 24—The U.S. Army announces that First Lieutenant William L. Calley, Jr., charged with the murder of at least 109 civilian South Vietnamese at Songmy in March, 1968, will receive a general court martial.

ALBANIA

Nov. 18—The Council of Ministers announces the abolition of personal income

taxes, the forgiving of farm debts and an across-the-board slash in the prices of basic commodities and equipment.

AUSTRALIA

Nov. 11—A new Cabinet is named by Prime Minister John Gorton following the October 25 general elections.

AUSTRIA

(See *Italy*)

BRAZIL

Nov. 4—Carlos Marighella, accused of planning the kidnapping of U.S. Ambassador C. Burke Elbrick, is shot and killed by federal police while resisting arrest.

BULGARIA

Nov. 22—The National Assembly ends a 4-year experiment that permitted direct foreign trade arrangements between groups of Bulgarian producers and foreign concerns. Charges of embezzlement brought about the curtailment of direct relations.

CAMBODIA

(See *Intl, War in Vietnam*)

CANADA

(See *Intl, U.N.*)

Nov. 3—Secretary of State for External Affairs Mitchell Sharp announces that Canada will close 7 diplomatic missions abroad to save money. Among those to be closed are the International Control Commission offices in Cambodia and Laos.

Nov. 10—A 4-month strike ends as representatives of the United Steel Workers and the International Nickel Company sign an agreement.

CHAD

Nov. 30—The government of President François Tombalbaye announces that the guerrilla rebellion is under control.

CHINA, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF (Communist)

(See also *U.S.S.R.*)

Nov. 6—Reports from Hong Kong say that

the Chinese government is calling for more discipline in the army and is deploying elite troops in case talks between the U.S.S.R. and China over their border dispute fail to bring peace.

Nov. 20—Reports from many provinces in China indicate large-scale construction of air raid shelters is under way.

CONGO REPUBLIC (Brazzaville)

Nov. 8—President Marien Ngouabi reports that an attempted coup against the government has been thwarted. The plotters are believed to want the restoration of former President Fulbert Youlou, who was ousted in 1963.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Nov. 17—On the 30th anniversary of the start of the Nazi wave of terror in World War II, Czechoslovak university students hold quiet demonstrations. Police with submachine guns are stationed near the universities to make sure that the demonstrations do not lead to anti-government meetings.

Nov. 20—Artists in Czechoslovakia are censured by Minister of Culture Miloslav Bruzek for "agitation" against the conservative regime.

Nov. 26—62 liberals are purged from the legislature.

Nov. 28—The government appoints Otakar Svercina to head the official press agency to "cleanse" liberals from the communications field.

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (West)

Nov. 23—A Central Bank spokesman reveals that West Germany will draw \$500 million from the International Monetary Fund to compensate for the loss of dollar reserves that occurred when the mark was revalued upward on October 24, 1969.

Nov. 25—Chancellor Willy Brandt offers "comprehensive negotiations" looking toward improved relations between West Germany and Poland.

Nov. 28—Following unanimous approval by the Cabinet, Chancellor Brandt signs the treaty to ban the spread of nuclear arms.

GREECE

Nov. 1—Seizure of newspapers by the military government is confirmed by Athens publishers. Press censorship was abolished four weeks ago, but the abolition was hedged with so many restrictions that publishers regarded the abolition as "a farce."

Nov. 15—In a news conference in Athens, a government spokesman announces the government's decision to abolish press privileges. The new restrictions are to "cleanse and discipline" the press. The full contents of the new laws are withheld, as are penalties for violations.

Nov. 27—Two Jordanian commandos, members of the Palestine Popular Struggle Front, throw a hand grenade into the Athens office of El Al Airlines, injuring 15 people.

INDIA

Nov. 1—A split develops in the ruling Congress party. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi heads the liberal faction, in opposition to the "Syndicate" of old guard leaders.

Nov. 12—Prime Minister Gandhi is "expelled" from the Congress party by the old guard for "grave acts of indiscipline." Mrs. Gandhi ignores the action as "illegal and of no validity."

Nov. 13—Prime Minister Gandhi wins an overwhelming vote of confidence from Parliament. In order to maintain control, Mrs. Gandhi will have to seek the cooperation of another party to replace the 50 to 75 votes held by the old guard faction of the Congress party.

Nov. 17—An attempt by the opposition wing of the Congress party to censure Prime Minister Gandhi is defeated in Parliament by a vote of 306 to 140.

Nov. 22—Mrs. Gandhi's faction of the Congress party ousts the president of the party for "dictatorial practices."

Nov. 23—Final links with the old guard fac-

tion are severed by Mrs. Gandhi's wing of the Congress party.

INDONESIA

Nov. 11—A report to *The New York Times* tells of serious problems facing former Communist sympathizers who are being released from prison camps where they have been held since the abortive Communist coup d'etat in 1965. Indonesian villagers, still angered by Communist slaying of villagers, are reported to be seeking revenge on the returning detainees.

IRAQ

Nov. 15—The Revolutionary Court hands down death sentences against 54 Iraqis charged with spying for the United States. Among those sentenced are a former Interior Minister and a former Labor Minister.

Nov. 16—The release of more than 150 political prisoners who were detained for membership in banned political organizations is announced.

ISRAEL

(See *Intl, Middle East Crisis*)

ITALY

Nov. 6—A call for a nationwide strike is issued by Italy's 3 largest trade unions after violence injures 31 people in Milan and Bari. Recent labor unrest is estimated to have cost Italy over one billion dollars.

Nov. 19—A 24-hour strike is observed by some 10 million workers in a nationwide general strike to demand better housing. This is the third general strike in 1969.

Nov. 30—An agreement is signed by Italy and Austria giving greater self-government to the South Tyrol area, which is under Italian control. Future disputes will be referred to the International Court of Justice at The Hague.

JAPAN

(See also *U.S. Foreign Policy*)

Nov. 7—In a press conference, Premier

Eisaku Sato says he is staking his political life on achieving the return of Okinawa to Japan. Sato will arrive in the U.S. November 17 for talks with U.S. President Richard Nixon.

Nov. 15—Some 70,000 police are mobilized to control students and union members protesting Sato's visit to the U.S.

Nov. 17—Police keep rioters away from the airport before Sato's departure for the U.S.

JORDAN

(See also *Intl, Middle East Crisis*)

Nov. 5—In Marka, a spokesman identifying himself only as "Mr. Salah" says that the Palestinian commando group that hijacked a Trans World airliner in August, 1969, is planning further anti-American acts, perhaps the hijacking of another TWA or Pan American airliner.

KENYA

Nov. 11—President Jomo Kenyatta announces that the first general election since independence 6 years ago will take place on December 6, 1969. All candidates will represent the Kenya African National Union.

KOREA, REPUBLIC OF (South)

Nov. 3—The state-run Korea Exchanges Bank devalues the *won* in a move to stimulate exports. Formerly 291.9 *won* to the U.S. dollar, the exchange rate will now be 305.1 *won* to the dollar.

Nov. 8—The leader of the New Democratic party, Kim Young Sam, announces he will run against President Chung Hee Park in the 1971 presidential election.

LEBANON

(See also *Intl, Middle East Crisis*)

Nov. 1—Violence continues between Lebanese army detachments and guerrilla groups.

Nov. 2—A cease-fire agreement is reached between Lebanese and Palestinian negotiators. Negotiations are continuing on the

right of Palestinians to operate against Israel from within Lebanon.

Nov. 5—Details of the Lebanese-Palestinian agreement are reported: firing into Israel from Lebanon is allegedly forbidden; only small units are to be allowed to infiltrate; refugees who join guerrilla units must leave Lebanon; no more than 2,000 commandos may remain in Lebanon at one time.

LIBYA

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Nov. 7—Defense Minister Adam al-Hawaz announces that Libya has canceled an order for antiaircraft missiles from Great Britain. The money will be diverted to building up the armed forces against Israel.

Nov. 14—Nationalization of all foreign banks is announced by the revolutionary government.

NEW ZEALAND

Nov. 29—Returns in parliamentary elections give the National party government of Prime Minister Keith Holyoake a slightly reduced majority.

PAKISTAN

Nov. 2—Rioting between Bengalis and immigrant Indians is broken up by troops which open fire into the crowd. Seven people have been killed in the fighting in the past 24 hours.

PERU

Nov. 1—U.S. government spokesmen say that William Chappers, a U.S. businessman living in Peru, is being held incommunicado by the military government.

PHILIPPINES

(See also *U.S., Military*)

Nov. 12—President Ferdinand Marcos is the winner in yesterday's national elections.

PORTUGAL

Nov. 8—Opposition groups, which were allowed to function during the legislative elections last month, are again declared

illegal by the Ministry of the Interior.

Nov. 19—The abolition of the Portuguese secret police organization is announced by the government.

RHODESIA

Nov. 1—The arrest of 2 white men and their detention without trial or without announcement of the charges against them shock Rhodesians. It has been public knowledge for some time that blacks have been detained in this way under the "state of emergency" decreed in 1965 after declaration of unilateral independence.

SOMALIA

Nov. 2—The Supreme Revolutionary Council which took power October 21, 1969, names 13 civilians to a 14-man Cabinet.

Nov. 3—Major General Mohamed Said Bare is named head of the government by the Supreme Revolutionary Council. Two other generals will be first and second vice presidents.

SOUTHERN YEMEN

Nov. 27—The government nationalizes 36 foreign firms. Among them are banks, foreign trade offices and petroleum operations.

The government charges that Saudi Arabian troops attacked across the frontier yesterday.

SPAIN

Nov. 24—Alejandro Rodriguez de Valcarcel is appointed to the post of President of the *Cortes* (legislature) by Generalissimo Francisco Franco.

SYRIA

Nov. 2—Some 50 Trans World Airlines engineers and technicians arrive in Syria to begin repairing the airliner hijacked to Damascus in August, 1969, and damaged by a bomb after it landed. Repairs to the plane will cost about \$4 million.

TUNISIA

Nov. 2—President Habib Bourguiba and the

other candidates of the Neo Destour party, running unopposed, are reelected to the presidency and the National Assembly respectively.

TURKEY

Nov. 3—A new 24-member Cabinet is named by Premier Suleyman Demirel. The new Cabinet is expected to aid Demirel to advance his program of creating new jobs, cutting red tape and bringing about a better balance between social and economic development.

U.S.S.R.

(See also *Intl. Disarmament*)

Nov. 7—Provincial papers report the establishment of a new military command on the central Asian border of the U.S.S.R. The command covers the 1,000 miles of border between China and the Soviet Union.

Nov. 30—The Soviet Union agrees to supply West Germany with natural gas from Siberia.

UNITED STATES

Civil Rights

Nov. 5—The Department of Justice asks the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit to give Mississippi school districts a chance to work out desegregation plans.

Nov. 6—The U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals declares that 30 Mississippi school districts must implement effective desegregation plans by December 31.

Secretary of Commerce Maurice H. Stans makes public details of an administration plan to make up to \$500 million available by June, 1970, for financing Negro business opportunities, through a Minority Enterprise Small Business Investment Company, to be known as Mesbic. The government will double the amount pledged by each corporation sponsoring Mesbic; 18 corporations have already pledged a minimum of \$150,000 each.

Nov. 11—Some 2,500 Negroes march peace-

fully through downtown Memphis, Tennessee; led by the chairman of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Ralph David Abernathy. The Negroes seek integrated schools; a black studies program in high schools, representation on the Board of Education and an end to the continuing strike at St. Joseph's Hospital. Last night police used tear gas and arrested 53 marchers for disorderly conduct during a protest march.

Nov. 14—The Department of Health, Education and Welfare says that its negotiations with 112 Southern school districts will be "immediately affected" by the Supreme Court decision of October 29. (See *U.S., Supreme Court, Current History*, December, 1968, p. 384.)

Foreign Policy

(See also *Intl, Middle East Crisis and Disarmament; Japan*)

Nov. 3—In a nationally televised major policy speech on the war in Vietnam, President Richard Nixon tells the American people that he has an orderly but secret timetable for withdrawing all U.S. ground combat troops from Vietnam as the South Vietnamese take over responsibility for the war. Declaring that the progress of negotiations in Paris and the level of combat activity will affect the pace of withdrawal, the President asks for popular support.

The U.S. and Canada agree to exchange more information about restrictive international business practices; closer anti-trust cooperation is initiated.

Nov. 9—*The New York Times* publishes highlights of New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller's report to the President on Latin America; the 137-page report, entitled "Quality of Life in the Americas," is to be published tomorrow.

Nov. 10—The President announces that the U.S. has invited other industrialized countries to join the U.S. in giving preferential tariff treatment to all underdeveloped nations; if the other industrialized nations do not agree to join, the U.S. will consider

acting to provide preferential treatment for Latin America alone.

Nov. 11—The observance of Veterans Day reflects support for the President's policies in Vietnam.

Nov. 13—Antiwar demonstrators begin the second Vietnam Moratorium protest with ceremonies in Washington, D.C.

Nov. 15—At least 250,000 war protesters march and demonstrate peacefully in Washington, D.C. A group of some 2,000 radicals clash with police as the radicals attempt to march on the South Vietnamese Embassy; tear gas is used to rout the crowd.

Some 100,000 protesters demonstrate in San Francisco in the biggest peace demonstration ever held on the West coast.

Nov. 16—Attorney General John Mitchell says that the second Vietnam Moratorium demonstration could not be called peaceful and blames the New Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam for the violence.

Nov. 17—Japan and the U.S. begin discussions on textile trade; voluntary reductions on Japanese shipment to the U.S. of wool and man-made fibers have been urged by the Nixon administration.

Nov. 19—The State Department announces that the U.S. is notifying Libya of its willingness to discuss early withdrawal of U.S. forces from Wheelus Air Force Base in Libya.

President Nixon confers with Japanese Premier Eisaku Sato in Washington.

Nov. 21—A U.S.-Japanese agreement providing for the return of Okinawa to Japan in 1972 is formally announced by President Nixon and Japanese Premier Sato. More flexible use of U.S. troops in Okinawa and in Japan is also provided for.

Government

(See also *Foreign Policy*)

Nov. 4—The White House announces staff changes; Daniel Patrick Moynihan, the President's adviser on urban affairs, and Bryce N. Harlow, assistant to the President for congressional relations, are raised

to Cabinet rank. Both receive the title of Counselor to the President. John D. Ehrlichman becomes assistant counsel to the President for domestic affairs, a post roughly comparable to that held by Henry Kissinger in national security matters.

Nov. 5—The Senate votes 63 to 14 to ask the President not to return Okinawa to Japan without its advice and consent.

Nov. 6—The Senate completes congressional action on a \$20.7-million military authorization bill covering fiscal 1970.

Nov. 7—A resolution supporting the President's effort to seek peace in Vietnam is introduced into the Senate by Senator Hugh Scott (R., Pa.) on behalf of himself, Senator Mike Mansfield (D., Mont.) and 38 other Senators.

The New York Times reports that the U.S. Secret Service has issued guidelines to federal and local law enforcement agencies asking for information about all those who "attempt to embarrass" high officials; participate in civil disturbances; seek "redress of imaginary grievances"; make "irrational" or "abusive statements"; are concerned with anti-American or anti-government demonstrations. The guidelines are an effort to follow the recommendations on presidential safety of the Warren Commission, which investigated the assassination of President John Kennedy.

Nov. 10—The President signs a bill empowering the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare to prohibit the sale of dangerous toys, i.e., toys that present mechanical, electrical or heat hazards.

Vice President Spiro Agnew criticizes antiwar protesters as a "strident minority" who raise "intolerant clamor and cacophony."

Nov. 12—301 members of the House of Representatives sign a resolution supporting President Nixon's "efforts to negotiate a just peace in Vietnam."

In a speech to the directors of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Director of the Budget Robert P. Mayo declares that the fiscal 1971 budget for the year that begins July 1, 1970, may exceed \$200 bil-

lion because of "mandatory increases" provided for in programs such as Social Security and Medicare.

The President's 21-member Commission on Income Maintenance Programs urges a universal income supplement based only on need, suggesting a minimum annual income of \$2400 for a family of 4.

Nov. 13—At Des Moines, Vice President Agnew charges that television networks offer the nation a biased version of the news; he urges the American people to "let the networks know that they want their news straight and objective."

The President visits each house of Congress separately to thank supporters of his Vietnam policy and to ask for understanding from his critics.

The President asks Attorney General John Mitchell to outline a 10-year program for federal prison reform.

The American Broadcasting Corporation confirms the fact that chairman of the Federal Communications Commission Dean Burch telephoned the heads of the three national television networks for transcripts of the comments of their reporters and commentators after the President's November 3 speech on Vietnam.

Nov. 15—Special counsel to President Nixon Clark Mollenhoff says that Agnew's views on biased news reporting "reflected the views of the Administration."

Nov. 18—The President signs a law authorizing a 10-year, \$300-million extension of the Great Plains conservation program; the federal government pays 50 per cent to 80 per cent of the cost.

Richard Kleindienst, Deputy Attorney General, says that the Department of Justice is investigating some leaders of the November antiwar protest.

Nov. 19—The Senate completes congressional action and sends the White House a 1-sentence measure amending the 1967 law forbidding the President to use a system of random selection to decide which young men should be drafted for military service. The President has promised to institute a lottery for 19-year-olds.

Nov. 20—Secretary of Agriculture Clifford Hardin orders that the use of DDT in residential areas must end within 30 days; by 1971, the pesticide is not to be used except in emergency cases.

In a speech in Alabama, Vice President Agnew criticizes the newspapers as unfair; he specifically criticizes *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post*, and deplores the growing concentration of corporate media control.

The Federal Communications Commission declares that television commentary on the President's November 3 speech met its "fairness" standard and is constitutionally protected.

Compromise legislation extends to March 31, 1971, the interest-equalization tax on U.S. purchases of foreign stocks and bonds. A rider exempts shotgun shells and high-power rifle bullets used by hunters from the federal law requiring registration of ammunition sales. The bill goes to the White House.

Nov. 21—Chairman of the F.C.C. Dean Burch says that the commission "cannot properly investigate to determine whether an account or analysis of a news commentator is 'biased' or 'true.'" Writing to a woman in Houston, Texas, who complained about the television coverage of the President's November 3 speech, Burch declares that "no government agency can authenticate the news, or should try to do so." His views are endorsed unanimously by the 7-member commission.

The Department of Health, Education and Welfare announces that foods containing cyclamates are to be labeled as over-the-counter nonprescriptive drugs.

The Senate votes 55 to 45 against confirming Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr., as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. This is the first time the Senate has refused to confirm a Supreme Court candidate since 1930.

Nov. 25—A unilateral pledge binding the U.S. never to engage in germ warfare and renouncing all but defensive uses of chemical warfare weapons is given by President

Nixon. He orders existing stocks of germ weapons destroyed. He exempts defoliants and tear gases from the general ban.

Nov. 26—The President signs a bill amending the Selective Service Act of 1967 to permit the President to draft men for the armed services by lottery; he announces that the first lottery will be held December 1 at Selective Service headquarters in Washington, D.C.

Nov. 28—President Nixon signs a \$24.6 appropriations bill for the fiscal year starting July 1, 1969, funding 17 departments.

Labor

Nov. 22—500 delegates to an emergency convention of the International Union of Electrical Workers vote unanimously to provide massive financial support for 88,500 members who are on strike against the General Electric Company. Each working member of the union is asked to contribute each week an amount equal to one hour's pay.

Nov. 28—The Labor Department refers a detailed audit of the United Mine Workers' books to the Justice Department for possible criminal prosecution.

Military

(See also *Government; Intl, War in Vietnam*)

Nov. 4—The Navy announces that it will retire 8 destroyers and inactivate 2 air units. The move is part of a previously announced economy drive.

Nov. 6—The Defense Department announces that "research breakthroughs" have permitted modifications of a controversial plan for the construction of a Navy submarine communication system called Project Sanguine. Opponents of the project in Northern Wisconsin, where it is to be constructed, cite ecological imbalance and radio and television interference as reasons for their opposition.

Nov. 14—Air Force spokesmen announce that U.S. activities at Mactan Air Force base in the Philippines will be terminated and that cutbacks will be made at Clark

Air Force base in the Philippines; the cut-backs are part of previously announced budgetary cuts.

The commander of NORAD (the North American Defense Command), a joint United States-Canadian air defense organization, announces the closing of 6 regional and divisional headquarters. NORAD is being reorganized to combine regions.

Nov. 17—The Labor Department announces a program, to begin next year, to train volunteers to enter military service after they have failed initial entrance tests.

Nov. 18—The Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee discloses that in testimony taken last month administration officials revealed that the U.S. has spent almost \$39 million since 1966 to send and maintain a Filipino construction battalion of 2,200 men in South Vietnam.

Nov. 22—Defense Secretary Melvin Laird announces that the January, 1970, draft call will total only 12,500 men; this will be the first call under the lottery system.

Nov. 26—President Nixon's press secretary, Ronald Ziegler, says that the alleged massacre at Songmy is "in direct violation of U.S. military policy" and "abhorrent to the conscience of all the American people."

Politics

Nov. 4—Linwood Holton is elected Governor of Virginia; he is the first Republican to be elected to the Virginia governorship in 83 years. President Nixon campaigned on behalf of Holton.

Republican candidate William T. Cahill is elected Governor of New Jersey. President Nixon campaigned in New Jersey on behalf of Cahill.

Nov. 19—The Democratic party's reform commission fails to recommend that delegates to future national conventions should be selected on the basis of proportional representation. The proposal would have eliminated the "winner take all" system of selecting delegates that is now in use in some states. The commission does urge that state delegations "bear a reason-

able relation" to the states' populations of Negroes, women and young people.

Nov. 20—The Democratic party's reform commission votes to require state parties to take into account Democratic voting strength as well as population in apportioning delegates to the national convention; the effect of the ruling will be to strengthen the cities and suburbs in future balloting at national conventions.

Science and Space

(See *Intl, Space*)

Supreme Court (See *Government*)

VIETNAM, REPUBLIC OF (South)

(See also *Intl, War in Vietnam*)

Nov. 2—A national convention to work toward a "truly representative government" for South Vietnam is urged by General Duong Van Minh. "Big Minh" has been in seclusion for a year in Saigon since his return from exile in Thailand.

Nov. 29—A Saigon court sentences 4 defendants to life imprisonment for treason and spying for North Vietnam.

YEMEN

Nov. 6—The National Assembly asks President Abdul Rahman al-Iryani to continue as chairman of the 3-member presidential council for the next 8 months. This is the fourth renewal of the chairmanship. Al-Iryani has protested each time, saying that the Yemenis must practice peaceful constitutional change of power.

ZAMBIA

Nov. 17—Negotiable bonds payable in American dollars will be given to the Roan Selection Trust and the Anglo-American Corporation in exchange for a 51 per cent interest in their copper facilities in Zambia, according to Zambian spokesmen.

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